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I. How THE SPIDER GOT THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES THAT COMPRISE THE WEB
Our Founding Fathers would be proud of the careful attention that Congress
paid to principles of federalism in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII). 1 Title VII imposes a nationwide prohibition on employment
discrimination, which is enforceable both by the federal agency the statute
establishes and in the federal courts.2 While rooting the Act's foundation
firmly in the federal government, Congress carefully crafted Title VII's
enforcement scheme to ensure the perpetuation of existing parallel state laws
aimed at making inequality in the workplace unlawful. 3  Congress
accomplished this by establishing a scheme of referral and deferral by the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)-the agency
established by Title VII and charged with its administrative enforcement-to
the agencies that administer state and local anti-discrimination laws.4 Thus,
any person alleging an unlawful employment practice in a state or locality
subject to its own anti-discrimination law must first file a charge with the local
authorities. 5 Only after the expiration of a sixty-day deferral period may Title
VII's federal mechanisms come into play.6 The EEOC further promotes the
referral and deferral scheme by requiring that if a charge is erroneously filed
with the EEOC before it is filed with the appropriate local authorities, the
EEOC must refer that charge to the appropriate local agency and refrain from
taking any further action on it for the sixty-day deferral period.7
This intricate system of referral and deferral seems to achieve its intended
purpose of promoting the continued eradication of workplace inequality at the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
2. Id. §§ 2000e-2-2000e-5.
3. Id. § 2000e-5(c)-(d).
4. Id
5. Id. § 2000e-5(c).
6. Id. § 2000e-(5)(c)-(d). By way of a brief primer on Title VII procedure, a
discrimination claimant must exhaust administrative remedies before he can file a lawsuit. Id. §
2000e-5(c). Exhaustion is accomplished by filing an administrative charge of discrimination with
the EEOC or with a comparable state agency. Id. If a state or local agency exists, the claimant
must initially file his charge there first, and the EEOC must "defer" to the state agency by taking
no action on the charge for at least sixty days. Id. § 2000e-5(c)-(d). After expiration of the sixty-
day deferral period, the claimant may continue to pursue his claim in the state system or may ask
the EEOC to intervene. Id. § 2000e-5(f). The agency may file a lawsuit on the claimant's behalf
or release the claim so that he may file it himself, but if the agency fails to complete its work on
the charge in a timely manner, the claimant may request a "right-to-sue" letter and proceed to
court. Id. Any subsequent lawsuit may be filed in either state or federal court. Id.; Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821 (1990) (holding that federal courts do not have
exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over Title VII lawsuits).
7. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(4)(i) (2008).
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local level while simultaneously creating the cooperative, mutually beneficial
relationship between state and federal governments intended by Congress. 8
Referral and deferral permits state and local authorities to retain exclusive
jurisdiction over employment discrimination complaints for sixty days in order
to conduct an investigation and, if necessary, schedule a hearing to adjudicate
the claims. 9 At the expiration of the sixty-day period, the charging party has
the freedom to choose whether to continue to pursue his claim through state or
local channels or, alternatively, to seek relief in the federal system by filing a
charge with the EEOC.'0
Although the referral and deferral system successfully includes states in the
process, it is not without its shortcomings. The tendency to create complicated
judicial preclusion issues is chief among them. This should come as no
surprise. Any enforcement scheme that permits pursuit of a single claim in as
many as four forums-administrative and judicial, on both the state and federal
levels-will inevitably give rise to situations in which a forum confronts a
claim previously adjudicated, in whole or in part, by another. Indeed, nothing
about Title VII and the regulations promulgated under it expressly prohibit
prosecution of a single claim in more than one-or even all-of the multiple
forums to which the statute grants jurisdictional authority." However, the
8. See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 472-73 (1982) ("'We recognized
that many States already have functioning antidiscrimination programs to insure equal access to
places of public accommodation and equal employment opportunity. We sought merely to
guarantee that these States-and other States which may establish such programs-will be given
every opportunity to employ their expertise and experience without premature interference by the
Federal Government."' (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 12,725 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)));
N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63-64 (1980) ("Congress envisioned that Title
VII's procedures and remedies would 'mes[h] nicely, logically, and coherently with the State and
city legislation,' and that remedying employment discrimination would be an area in which '[t]he
Federal Government and the State governments could cooperate effectively."' (alteration in
original) (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7205 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark))); Oscar Mayer & Co.
v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755 (1979) (stating that deferral provisions of Title VII are "intended to
give state agencies a limited opportunity to resolve problems of employment discrimination");
Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972) (identifying the purpose of deferral provisions as
"to give state agencies a prior opportunity to consider discrimination complaints"); 29 C.F.R. §
1601.13(a)(4)(i) ("It is the intent of the Commission to thereby encourage the maximum degree of
effectiveness in the State and local agencies.").
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(3)(ii). Whether this sixty-day period is sufficient to permit the
agency to conduct and complete an investigation and hearing-and it likely is not-is beyond the
scope of this Article.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.3(a)(3)(ii) ("Section 706(c) of Title VII grants
States and their political subdivisions the exclusive right to process allegations of discrimination
filed by a person other than a Commissioner for a period of 60 days .... After the expiration of
the exclusive processing period, the Commission may commence processing the allegation of
discrimination.").
11. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974) (noting "a
congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently [a remedy] under both Title
VII and other applicable state and federal statutes").
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statute leaves the parameters of the dual system it creates almost entirely
undefined.
In the midst of this uncertainty, the United States Supreme Court has offered
little clarity in the years since Congress enacted Title VII. First, the Court has
drawn a line between state administrative proceedings and any subsequent
judicial review by state courts, so that state-agency determinations on
unreviewed claims covered by Title VII have no preclusive effect in a
subsequent suit asserting the same claims in federal court.' 2 Thus, a claimant
whose grievance receives full consideration by the relevant state or local
agency but does not reach the state courts may, without facing a preclusive bar,
assert that same claim to the EEOC and in a subsequent federal lawsuit.13 This
scenario is most likely to arise when the claimant does not prevail in the state
or local administrative forum. Having failed to convince the local
administrative authorities of his claim's merit, he may turn to the federal
system with the hope of obtaining a better result. Of course, he could also seek
direct review of the state agency's determination by filing an appeal with the
appropriate state court. 14 However, a claimant receiving sound legal advice
should be wary of following this course in light of the risk that it carries of a
binding adverse determination.!
5
That risk of a binding adverse determination on appeal in the state court
system illustrates the second limitation on Title VII's dual enforcement
scheme. In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., the Court declared that
federal courts must afford preclusive effect to state-court judgments entered on
review of agency determinations, at least in cases in which the agency found
that no discrimination occurred, the state court affirmed the agency's findings,
12. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796 (1986).
13. Id. at 795-96. Although it is well-established that a Title VII claimant must first
exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal court, courts disagree about
the admissibility and weight of EEOC determinations in subsequent judicial proceedings. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (requiring exhaustion of remedies with the EEOC before filing a Title VII
suit in federal court); 8 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR § 106:5 (West 2009) (discussing the
varying approaches taken by federal circuit courts on questions of the admissibility and weight of
EEOC findings). Whether to admit EEOC findings in subsequent federal-court trials and the
degree of weight they are due if so admitted are questions that lie beyond the scope of this
Article.
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-183(a) (West 2009) ("A person who has exhausted all
administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may
appeal to the Superior Court as provided in this section."); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 298 (McKinney
2009) (providing for judicial review of Human Rights Commission determinations in state
supreme courts); ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE ORD. § 3-1-25(F) (2009) (permitting the state
courts to review rulings of the administrative Personnel Board).
15. See 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
4471.3 (2d ed. 2002) ("The distinction between administrative orders that have been reviewed
and those that have not been reviewed creates an incentive to avoid state-court review of adverse
findings.").
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and state law bars relitigation. 16 In Kremer, the Court held that a judgment of
the New York Appellate Division affirming the findings of a state agency
charged with enforcement of New York's anti-discrimination law was entitled
to preclusive effect in a subsequent federal lawsuit asserting the same claim.'
7
The Court reasoned that state preclusion law should apply in those
circumstances because Title VII did not supersede the centuries-old full faith
and credit statute, codified at § 1738 of title 28 of the United States Code,
which requires that federal courts afford state-court judgments the same
treatment that the state's appellate courts would provide.1 8 This rule remains
good law despite its age; therefore, courts faced with Title VII claims that were
previously found meritless by state agencies administering comparable laws
must afford any state-court judgment affirming such a finding the same weight
that the state appellate courts would. 19
Thus, in the nearly fifty years since Title VII's enactment, the Court has
provided some instruction on the proper treatment of Title VII claims that are
transactionally related to claims previously adjudicated in the parallel state
systems that Congress deliberately left in place. Unreviewed state-agency
determinations have no preclusive effect in subsequent federal-court lawsuits
and may be relitigated.20 By contrast, courts must give full faith and credit to
any state-court judgment affirming a state-agency finding that a claim lacked
merit.21 However, many questions remain unanswered, and one cannot begin
to resolve them without first identifying them with some precision. Broadly
construed, Kremer could stand for the proposition that federal courts must give
full faith and credit to any final state-court judgment entered on review of a
state administrative determination in the employment discrimination context.
22
Closer scrutiny of the Court's opinion, however, indicates that its holding was
much more limited. The Court carefully framed the question presented and its
holding narrowly by reiterating the precise circumstances giving rise to that
case: the respondent prevailed at the administrative level, and the claimant
23invoked the state judicial forum, where the agency findings were affirmed.
16. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 476-77.
19. See id. at 469-70; McInnes v. California, 943 F.2d 1088, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1991);
Elliott v. Univ. of Tenn., 766 F.2d 982, 987-88 (6th Cir. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 478
U.S. 788 (1986).
20. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796.
21. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 485.
22. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
23. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 463, 485. As will be discussed below, the lower courts have
generally adopted the broader view of Kremer's reach, reflective of their tendency to feel at least
somewhat bound by Supreme Court dicta. See infra p. 441 (discussing application of Kremer in
the lower courts). See generally Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Parsing Supreme Court Dicta to
Adjudicate Non-Workplace Harms, 57 DRAKE L. REv. 75 (2008) (proposing a framework for
identifying and handling Supreme Court dicta).
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The inquiry, therefore, examines how far the Kremer rule extends. In other
words, must a federal court afford a state-court judgment the same full faith
and credit demanded in Kremer when the state court reverses the agency
determination rather than affirming it? What about when the claimant, rather
than the respondent, prevails initially in the administrative proceedings as was
the case in Kremer? Moreover, to extend the problem further, what if the
claimant seeks relief in federal court that was not available at the state level? It
is the last of these questions that has created the most dissension among the
circuit courts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
2 4
recently came down firmly on the side of the Seventh25 and Eighth26 Circuits
by permitting a claimant to seek relief that was unavailable in state
proceedings even after entry of final judgment by a state court on the same
claims; however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
disagreed, declaring that a claimant cannot duplicate his claims in this
manner.
27
24. Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2006).
25. Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 856-57 (7th Cir. 1985).
26. Jones v. Am. State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 495,498 (8th Cir. 1988).
27. Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2000). The circuit split received some
attention at the time of the Nestor decision, but commentators have remained silent on it since
then. See James 0. Castagnera et al., Second Circuit Allows Title VII Plaintiff "Second Bite at the
Apple" for Federal Remedies Not Available in State Administrative Proceeding, 22 NO. 12
TERMINATION OF EMP. BULL. 3, 3 (Dec. 2006) ("The Second Circuit joined the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits in allowing employees to bring a state administrative action under state anti-
discrimination laws and, after prevailing, bring a subsequent federal action for additional
remedies such as attorney's fees and punitive damages available in federal court."); Circuit Rev.
Staff, Current Circuit Splits, 3 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 507, 517-18 (2007) [hereinafter
Current Circuit Splits] (identifying Nestor as part of the circuit split on the issue of "Title VII
claims filed in federal court seeking supplemental remedies unavailable in state court");
Employment Discrimination-Procedure: Title VII Plaintiff Who Wins at State Level Obtains
Supplemental Relief in Federal Court, 75 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 1200 (Oct. 10, 2006) [hereinafter
Employment Discrimination-Procedure] (noting that the Second Circuit's decision in Nestor
involved "an issue that has split the circuits"). While this particular issue has not received the
attention that it deserves, the finality of judgments in employment-discrimination suits has
warranted substantial attention over the years since Title VII's enactment. See, e.g., David C.
Belt, Election of Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law: Doorway into the Legal Hall of
Mirrors, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 145, 149-50 (1995) (criticizing Title VII's dual-enforcement
scheme on the grounds that it necessitates an election of remedies in such a way that "runs
contrary both to the theory of employment discrimination law generally and to its own desired
effects of streamlining procedures while preserving the autonomy of a complainant"); Andrea
Catania & Charles A. Sullivan, Judging Judgments: The 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Lingering
Ghost of Martin v. Wilks, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 995, 996-97 (1992) (evaluating finality of
judgments in employment discrimination suits after Martin v. Wilks and the Civil Rights Act of
1991); Michael J. Davidson, Crest: Judicial Preclusion of an Independent Suit Solely for
Attorneys' Fees Under Title VII?, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 425, 426 (1993) (arguing that Title VII
does not permit fees-only federal suits under the authority of Crest); Charles C. Jackson et al.,
The Proper Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. REV.
1485, 1501 (1981) (proposing a preclusion framework applicable in Title VII cases); Michael J.
Maransky, Issue Preclusion-Assessing the Issue Preclusive Effect of State Agency Decisions in
[Vol. 59:427
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These circuit courts have also raised another distinct but interrelated issue:
whether the federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim that only
seeks certain relief available under Title VII but does not request adjudication
of any substantive rights granted by the statute. That is, notwithstanding that
the claims may be barred, do the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
independent claims for certain remedies after full adjudication of the
underlying substantive claims in state administrative and judicial proceedings?
The Supreme Court has addressed this issue outside of the Title VII context.
In North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Crest Street Community
Council, Inc., the Court held that the federal district courts lack subject-matter
jurisdiction over independent suits seeking only attorney's fees after final
administrative adjudication of the underlying Title VI claims in state
proceedings.28 Although the Court has never expressly adopted this view
under Title VII, some defendants have interpreted it to suggest that after final
adjudication in administrative proceedings, plaintiffs cannot proceed separately
in federal court to obtain attorney's fees, notwithstanding the fact that such
fees would otherwise be available under the statute.29 Thus, to spin the web
analogy even further, the spider has added a layer to the preclusion controversy
by weaving in a subject-matter jurisdiction debate.
The knotty web of preclusion and jurisdiction issues spun by Title VII's dual
enforcement scheme and exacerbated by seemingly irreconcilable case law
cries out for disentanglement, but has received very little attention from
scholars in the modem era. This Article will attempt to fill that void by
untangling the web, offering answers to unresolved questions and proposing a
resolution to the particular problem of splitting relief that divides the circuit
courts. It will justify those answers in light of the statutory language and its
legislative history, relevant Supreme Court precedents, and prevailing policy
concerns. The Article proceeds in three parts, with each Part disentangling
another of the web's threads. Part II examines the administrative layer of the
web, fleshing out the applicable rules in federal cases subsequent to state
administrative determinations. Part III will unravel the state-judgment thread.
It begins with a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Kremer and then
the Third Circuit, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1079, 1079-80 (1994) ("When federal litigation commences
after state agency proceedings have been completed, debate exists about whether the factual
findings of the state agency, or agencies, have issue preclusive effect in the subsequent lawsuit
based on the federal statute."); Robert H. Thomas, Comment, Gaining Access to a Federal
Forum: The Preclusive Effect of Unreviewed Administrative Determinations in Section 1983
Actions, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 643 (1987) (discussing the operation of the preclusion doctrine in
civil-rights litigation).
28. N.C. Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Cmty. Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 14-15 (1986). Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination by recipients of federal funding. Id. at
8 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006)).
29. See, e.g., Chris, 221 F.3d at 654-55 (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction
"because a suit solely for attorney's fees and costs is not ... a suit to enforce the substantive
protections of Title VII").
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examines how the lower courts have applied that decision, revealing the
questions left unanswered by Kremer and proposing answers to them. Part IV
tackles the most complex part of the web-the additional-remedy cases. It first
unwinds the thread comprised of cases seeking only attorney's fees incurred in
prior state proceedings, proposing a controlling statutory framework. It then
delves into the remainder of the additional-remedy cases and the preclusion
rules that govern them. Part and parcel to this unraveling is a parsing of the
cases that have established different rules in the various circuit courts of
appeal. As Part V summarizes, Parts II, III, and IV, taken together, supply a
framework for adjudicating Title VII claims brought to federal court after full
adjudication in the pertinent state system, suggesting that some claims ought to
proceed but that others cannot, either because the court lacks authority to
decide them or because they should be barred by the operation of common-law
preclusion.
II. SEPARATING THE FIRST THREAD: UNREVIEWED AGENCY DETERMINATIONS
The first category of cases-those previously adjudicated in state
administrative proceedings but otherwise unreviewed-breaks free from the
complex preclusion web quite easily. Indeed, the Supreme Court spoke
directly to such cases when it decided University of Tennessee v. Elliott.30 The
plaintiff in Elliott requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) after being informed by his employer, the university, that his
employment would be terminated due to poor performance and misconduct.
31
The ALJ ultimately rejected the plaintiff's contention that his discharge was
racially motivated, and the vice president of the university division in which
the terminated employee previously worked affirmed the ALJ's findings.
32
The plaintiff then pursued his related Title VII claims in the federal district
court; however, in order to bar the plaintiff from litigating his Title VII claims,
the university moved for summary judgment on the ground that the ALJ's
determination was entitled to preclusive effect. 33 The district court granted the
university's motion, but that decision was reversed by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which held that res judicata does not bar Title
VII claims that were the subject of an unreviewed state-agency
determination. 34 The Supreme Court agreed with the Sixth Circuit and held
that unreviewed state-agency determinations have no preclusive effect in
subsequent lawsuits asserting Title VII claims arising from the same
incidents. 35 The Court reasoned that a common-law rule of preclusion would
30. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 792 (1986).
31. Id. at 790.
32. Id. at 791-92.
33. Id. at 792.
34. Id. at 792-94.
35. Id. at 796.
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be inconsistent with Congress's apparent intent-reflected in the statute's
provision that the EEOC must afford state-agency determinations "substantial
weight"-to ensure plaintiffs de novo review after adjudication at the state
36
administrative level. According to the Court, "it would make little sense for
Congress to write such a provision if state-agency findings were entitled to
preclusive effect in Title VII actions in federal court" because such an
interpretation would render that provision superfluous.37  Furthermore, the
Court rejected the university's contention that the decision in Kremer dictated
a different result. The Court explained that the full faith and credit statute
underlying the Kremer holding did not apply in this context in which an
administrative agency-not a court-made the pertinent findings.
38
The Court's holding in Elliott makes clear that an unreviewed agency
determination adverse to the claimant has no preclusive effect.39  Thus, a
claimant who has sought relief at the state administrative level may, after
exhausting his remedies before the EEOC, proceed directly to federal court
without concern that the agency's adverse findings will affect his ability to
recover.40 As referenced above, this may be the advisable course of action-
especially in those cases in which the agency's findings are unfavorable-
given the risk of a binding final judgment under Kremer if the employer again
41prevails on appeal. Indeed, it is precisely because of the risk that Kremer
poses that many cases will fall into this category, as plaintiffs facing adverse
36. Id. at 795.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 796.
39. See 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 4471.3 (discussing the parameters of and
rationale for the Elliott rule that unreviewed administrative findings are not entitled to preclusive
effect). There are many examples of courts adhering to this rule. See, e.g., Caver v. City of
Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court's denial of issue
preclusive effect to the findings of a state administrative law judge respecting plaintiffs fitness
for duty after dismissal of related Title VII claims); Bishop v. City of Birmingham Police Dep't,
361 F.3d 607, 610 (1lth Cir. 2004) (stating that the district court erred in applying issue
preclusion to unreviewed findings of a state administrative agency); Kosereis v. Rhode Island,
331 F.3d 207, 212 (lst Cir. 2004) (refusing to apply preclusive effect, in light of the Elliott ruling,
to an unreviewed state-agency determination that plaintiff had been laid off, notwithstanding that
state courts would afford that finding preclusive effect); Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 624
(2d Cir. 2001) (refusing preclusive effect to unreviewed findings in a police administrative
proceeding); Mclnnes v. California, 943 F.2d 1088, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing the
district court's grant of preclusive effect to the State Personnel Board's decision).
40. One might attempt to avoid Elliott's impact by suggesting that the agency was not
administrative but, rather, acted judicially such that its decision should be treated as one rendered
by a court. The defendant-employer made this argument, unsuccessfully, in McInnes. Mclnnes,
943 F.2d at 1094-95. The Mclnnes court rejected that argument, concluding that the California
agency was indeed administrative and therefore triggered application of the Elliott rule. Id.
41. See 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 4471.3 ("The distinction between
administrative orders that have been reviewed and those that have not been reviewed creates an
incentive to avoid state-court review of adverse findings.").
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agency determinations will often choose to pursue their remedies directly in
the federal forum.
Elliott covers the landscape here quite thoroughly. However, because that
case involved a claimant who lost at the administrative level, one could argue
that the Elliott rule against preclusion does not apply in those cases in which
the claimant initially prevailed and subsequently sought to rely on the
favorable agency findings in a later federal suit. Given the strength of the
Court's conclusion, as well as prevailing policy concerns, this argument should
fail.
The Court in Elliott based its determination primarily on relevant statuto 7
language, the import of which does not depend on which party prevailed.
The Court first rejected an argument that the full faith and credit statute
requires courts to respect administrative determinations."3 "[B]ecause § 1738
[the full faith and credit statute] antedates the development of administrative
agencies," the Court found inconclusive the fact that the statute does not
mandate that preclusive effect be given to unreviewed state-agency
determinations. Turning to the language of Title VII, the Court focused on §
2000e-5(b)'s mandate that the EEOC give "substantial weight" to local agency
findings.45  The Court reasoned that it would be nonsensical to accord
preclusive effect to administrative determinations in federal court when they
receive only "substantial weight" before the EEOC.46  Thus, the Court held
that neither the full faith and credit statute nor Title VII supported a policy of
treating unreviewed administrative findings as binding. 7
Likewise, prevailing policy concerns also suggest that Elliott's rule against
defensive use of agency determinations applies with equal force in the
offensive context. In short, it would be unfair for a plaintiff who need not
worry about suffering the effects of an adverse agency determination to reap
the benefits of a favorable one. This is especially true in the absence of any
statutory support for doing so. Thus, confined to its context, the rule of
42. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 795-96 (1986).
43. Id. at 794-95.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 795 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006)).
46. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)).
47. Id. at 796.
48. See, e.g., Roth v. Koppers Indus. Inc., 993 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting
that "Elliott applies with equal force when a Title VII plaintiff attempts to assert collateral
estoppel on the basis of a favorable factfinding in an unreviewed state administrative proceeding"
and that the Court's unequivocal, generally applicable language is supported by plain statutory
meaning, legislative history, and applicable precedents); Mclnnes v. California, 943 F.2d 1088,
1096 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiff was not barred from proceeding on her Title VII suit
in federal district court even though she prevailed and obtained relief from a state administrative
agency based on the same claims); cf Tice v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 515 F. Supp. 2d 580,
599-600 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (determining that Elliott's rule against preclusion does not apply to
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Elliott is plain: unreviewed agency findings have no preclusive effect in
subsequent federal suits brought under Title VII.
49
III. DETACHING THE SECOND THREAD: SEEKING THE SAME REMEDIES AS IN
PREVIOUS JUDICIALLY REVIEWED DETERMINATIONS
Untangling the web becomes more difficult upon reaching the second thread,
which includes cases in which the plaintiff attempts to pursue the same claims
and remedies in federal court that he pursued at the state administrative level
after a judicial body has entered a final judgment reviewing an agency's
findings.5° The Supreme Court has entered the fray here as well, but without
covering the landscape as fully as in the context of unreviewed findings. In
Kremer, the Court held that § 1738 requires federal courts in Title VII cases to
give preclusive effect to state-court judgments reviewing administrative
determinations, so long as the courts of the state that rendered the judgment
would do so. 51 The Court based its reasoning primarily upon the language of
the two governing statutes-the full faith and credit statute and Title VII-and
concluded that the latter had not repealed the former; therefore, the full-faith-
final orders of the Secretary of Labor under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because the Act expressly
prohibits such collateral attacks).
49. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796. This rule marks a departure from the prevailing law applicable
to civil-rights claims under the Reconstruction Acts. In such cases, the Court has determined that
agency findings do have preclusive effect. See id. at 796-99. Whether this distinction is
satisfying or not is a matter of some contention, but it lies beyond the scope of this Article. See
18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 4471.3.
50. This discussion assumes the conclusion of the state proceedings via a state court's entry
of final judgment on review of administrative determinations. The stage at which the plaintiff
invokes the federal forum makes a difference. Most state and local anti-discrimination laws
provide that the administrative agency must relinquish jurisdiction over a claimant's request after
the lapse of a specified time period. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-101 (West 2009)
("The complainant ... may request a release from the commission if his complaint with the
commission is still pending after the expiration of two hundred ten days from the date of its
filing."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (providing that a Title VII plaintiff can obtain a right-
to-sue letter from the EEOC and file a federal lawsuit 180 days after a state-agency action is filed
if "the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section"); id. § 2000e-5(c)-(d)
(permitting the EEOC to act on a charge after deferring to a state agency for sixty days). Under
those circumstances, there would be no state determination and thus no question that preclusion is
inapplicable. When the plaintiff files suit in federal court after resolution by the state agency, but
while state judicial review remains pending (and thus prior to entry of a final judgment), the
federal court will typically enter a stay pending resolution of the state proceedings and will then
accord those proceedings preclusive effect under the rule of Kremer. See Nestor v. Pratt &
Whitney, 466 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2006) ("If [plaintiff] had filed her action in federal court (or
state court) while [defendant's] appeals from the [state administrative agency's] determination
was [sic] still pending, the issue presented on this appeal would likely not arise: A federal court
will typically stay the action pending the state appeals and (when the appeals are decided) give
resjudicata effect to the result." (citing Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 487-88 n.3
(1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
51. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 485 (majority opinion).
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and-credit command remained in force. 52 The Court also searched the text of
Title VII for evidence of direct conflict with § 1738 or substitute coverage of
that statute's sphere; neither, however, could be found.53  The Court
determined instead that Title VII reflected a clear intention to leave § 1738
untouched:
No provision of Title VII requires claimants to pursue in state
court an unfavorable state administrative action, nor does the Act
specify the weight a federal court should afford a final judgment by a
state court if such a remedy is sought. While we have interpreted the
"civil action" authorized to follow consideration by federal and state
administrative agencies to be a "trial de novo,". . . neither the statute
nor our decisions indicate that the final judgment of a state court is
subject to redetermination at such trial.54
Applying its determination to the facts, the Court directed that preclusive effect
be accorded to the state-court judgment affirming the agency's conclusion that
the plaintiffs claims of discrimination lacked merit.
55
The Kremer decision made clear that a final state-court judgment affirming
an agency's dismissal of a Title VII discrimination claim is subject to the same
preclusive effect in a subsequent federal-court suit as would be applied by the
courts of the rendering state. However, the parameters and scope of the
holding remained unclear, and the Court itself gave somewhat mixed messages
about the reach of its decision. First, the Court began by framing the question
presented in Kremer quite broadly, asking "whether Congress intended Title
VII to supersede the principles of comity and repose embodied in § 173 8.,,56
In the very next sentence, however, the Court articulated the issue more
narrowly:
Specifically, we decide whether a federal court in a Title VII case
should give preclusive effect to a decision of a state court upholding
a state administrative agency's rejection of an employment
discrimination claim as meritless when the state court's decision
would be res judicata in the State's own courts.57
The Court's final holding includes much of the same qualifying language:
Because there is no "affirmative showing" of a "clear and manifest"
legislative purpose in Title VII to deny res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect to a state court judgment affirming that a claim of
52. Id. at 466-70. The Court stated: "Since an implied repeal must ordinarily be evident
from the language or operation of a statute, the lack of such manifest incompatability [sic]
between Title VII and § 1738 is enough to answer our inquiry." Id. at 470.
53. Id. at 468-69.
54. Id. at 469-70 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 485. The plaintiff's claims were therefore barred. Id. at 479.
56. Id. at 463.
57. Id.
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employment discrimination is unproved, and because the procedures
provided in New York for the determination of such claims offer a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the merits, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is Affirmed.5 8
Thus, by stating the issue and holding with specificity, the Court left room to
maneuver for future litigants striving to avoid Kremer's import.
A. Equal Application, Win or Lose
The argument offered most commonly to confine Kremer's reach proposes
limiting its application to cases presenting the situation existing in Kremer-
the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, filed the appeal invoking the state
judicial forum. Upon receipt of an adverse determination by both the New
York State Division of Human Rights (NYHRD) and its Appeal Board on his
age and religion discrimination claims, Ruben Kremer filed a petition for
review with the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court.5 9 When
that court unanimously affirmed the administrative findings, Kremer obtained
a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC (where his charge had been pending
during the state proceedings) and filed a Title VII action in federal district60 61
court.60 The defendant responded with a motion to dismiss, which the court
initially denied but subsequently granted based on a change in Second Circuit
authority. 62 The key fact for those wishing to limit Kremer's reach is that the
plaintiff invoked the state judicial forum whose judgment ultimately barred
him from proceeding in federal court.
The Kremer preclusion rule should apply regardless of which party invokes
the state judicial forum. The language of the Court's opinion leaves little room
for debate. As discussed above, central to the Court's rationale was its
63
conclusion that Title VII does not repeal § 1738. Finding no express repeal
in Title VII, the Court turned to the plaintiffs suggestion that because Title VII
directs the EEOC to accord state determinations only "substantial weight,"
those determinations do not warrant preclusive effect in a federal court.6 4 The
Court rejected this argument, reasoning that if state determinations are never
preclusive, their finality depends entirely upon the outcome-judgments
58. Id. at 485.
59. Id. at 464 & n.2.
60. Id. at 464-65.
61. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 587, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aft'd, 623 F.2d
786 (2d Cir. 1980), af'd, 456 U.S. 461 (1982). The motion likely should have been filed as a
motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 because of the necessity
of reviewing transcripts and pleadings from the state-court proceedings in order to decide the
motion. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b). It does not appear, however, that this distinction troubled the
district court. Kremer, 477 F. Supp. at 590.
62. Kremer, 477 F. Supp. at 590-91.
63. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468-70; see also supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Court's rationale in Kremer.
64. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468-70.
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favorable to plaintiffs would always be final, while defense judgments would
be subject to subsequent lawsuits filed by unhappy plaintiffs. 6  Thus, even
though the Court did not expressly limit its holding to cases in which the
plaintiff invoked the state judicial forum, its rationale strongly suggests that
that limitation is implausible. The Court made clear its disdain for a preclusion
rule dependent on which party prevailed in the first instance.
Plaintiffs hoping to avoid the effect of an unfavorable state-court
determination may point to the Kremer Court's statement that "[n]o provision
of Title VII requires claimants to pursue in state court an unfavorable state
administrative action. ' '66 The argument here must be that because Title VII
does not mandate seeking relief through the state system, a plaintiff should not
be bound when his adversary does so. The strongest appeal for this argument
lies in its policy implications-that a plaintiff should not be bound by the
judgment of a forum he did not choose. This argument, however, should fail.
As an initial matter, the Court's statement in this regard says nothing about the
preclusive effect of a judgment varying with the outcome. The statement
merely suggests that a claimant may choose whether to pursue relief from an
unfavorable administrative decision in state courts or to proceed to the federal
system instead. The Court's statement is insufficient to overcome the broad
language that it employed in holding that Title VII does not repeal § 1738.
Moreover, the Court subsequently interpreted its own decision in Kremer to
sweep broadly in its application.
67
The pertinent statutory language in § 1738 and its underlying purposes
further support equal application of the Kremer preclusion rule regardless of
who prevailed below. Section 1738 is founded upon core federalism principles
that do not vary with the outcome of the underlying litigation. 68 The language
of the statute itself is unequivocal: "[the] Acts, records and judicial
proceedings ... [of the States] shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States.. . as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State... from which they are taken." 69 Furthermore, none of the Court's
principal interpretations of the statute even hint that its application varies with
changes in the identity of the prevailing party, 7° nor does Title VII reflect any
65. Id. at 470.
66. Id. at 469; see, e.g., Trujillo v. County of Santa Clara, 775 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir.
1985) (acknowledging plaintiffs reliance on that statement in an attempt to avoid Kremer's
import).
67. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 381 (1985) ("Kremer
held that § 1738 applies to a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII ....").
68. See generally id at 380 ("Section 1738 embodies concerns of comity and federalism
that allow the States to determine, subject to the requirements of the statute and the Due Process
Clause, the preclusive effect ofjudgments in their own courts.").
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
70. See, e.g., Marrese, 470 U.S. at 380 ("The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a
subsequent federal lawsuit generally is determined by the full faith and credit statute ...."); Allen
v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) ("Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give
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intention that plaintiffs should be free to relitigate unfavorable state-court
determinations while relying on favorable ones. Instead, the provision for
federal-court relief contemplates only that the state administrative agency has
had the opportunity to assess the claims and does not render the viability of the
federal suit contingent in any way on the state's final determination.
7 1
The lower courts are in accord with the interpretation that Kremer preclusion
does not depend on the outcome at the state level. The First and Eighth
Circuits both confronted this issue shortly after the Supreme Court's decision
in Kremer, and both relied upon the Court's statement that "the finality of state
court decisions should not 'depend on which side prevailed in a given case' to
conclude that Kremer sweeps broadly.72 The First Circuit summarized this
point well: "[i]n short, a fair reading of Kremer shows that its rationale rests on
neutral principles, not on the happenstance of which party--employer or
employee-brings the state court action. 73 Other courts have since expressed
agreement with this position.74  Indeed, a thorough review of federal-court
decisions did not reveal any case in which a plaintiffs argument to limit
Kremer to cases in which the defendant invoked the state judicial forum
prevailed. Thus, Kremer's reach is broad, and preclusion applies no matter
which party initiated appeal to the state court.
preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the
judgments emerged would do so .... "); Hollimon v. Shelby County Gov't, 325 F. App'x 406,
410 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Federal courts must give state-court judgments-including those affirming
state administrative-agency decisions-the same preclusive effect that the state courts would give
them. That is no less true for Title VII actions." (citations omitted)); Engquist v. Or. Dep't of
Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 1007 (9th Cir. 2007) ("The full faith and credit statute compels federal
courts to give collateral estoppel and res judicata effects to the judgments of state courts."
(internal quotation marks omitted)), aft'd, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (2006).
72. Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 727 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1984); see also Hickman v.
Elec. Keyboarding, Inc., 741 F.2d 230, 232 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that the preclusion rule of
Kremer does not turn on which party sought review in the state court).
73. Gonsalves, 727 F.2d at 29.
74. See, e.g., Zanders v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d 1127, 1132 (6th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that an alternate, but not controlling, rationale of Kremer was that the plaintiff had the
choice whether to bring the discrimination action in state court or through the EEOC and thus
deserved preclusion, although the Kremer Court did not make this distinction explicitly); Trujillo
v. County of Santa Clara, 775 F.2d 1359, 1364 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that instead of emphasizing
which party initiated the state-court review, the Kremer Court "focused on the existence of the
state court judgment and indicated that the finality of state court judgments should not 'depend on
which side prevailed in a given case"' (quoting Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,
470 (1982))); see also Unger v. Consol. Foods Corp., 693 F.2d 703, 710 n.l 1 (7th Cir. 1982)
(deeming irrelevant which party started review at the state-court level in light of Kremer's
holding that "Title VII does not partially repeal § 1738 and any state court decision must
therefore be accorded preclusive effect, [thus] it should be immaterial whether plaintiff or
defendant initiated the state court review").
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B. Differential Deference
Some plaintiffs attempt to avoid Kremer preclusion by suggesting that it
does not apply when the state court's standard of review calls for substantial
deference to the agency findingsY. This argument is appealing at first blush
because application of the preclusion doctrine means respecting the judgment
of the rendering court. If the court never examined the merits of the
underlying claims, but simply reviewed the methods applied in the prior
administrative proceeding, then it may seem natural to question the reliability
of that judgment when it is offered preclusively in a subsequent suit. Thus, the
court's decision arguably would not be "on the merits" as is often required for
most preclusion rules to apply.76 However, closer scrutiny of the Court's
opinion in Kremer defeats this argument.
As a threshold matter, the Kremer Court expressly rejected this contention.
The plaintiff in Kremer argued that his Title VII claim should not be prohibited
by the state court's judgment "because the New York courts did not resolve the
issue that the District Court must hear under Title V1I-whether Kremer had
suffered discriminatory treatment ... While this argument did not focus
solely on the standard of review (because the Court also addressed the absence
of any meaningful distinction between the governing state anti-discrimination
laws and Title VII), the Court nevertheless devoted substantial attention to the
law that governed the state court's assessment. 78 In its review of applicable
New York law, the Court concluded that the decisions of the Appellate
Division evaluating the NYHRD rulings constituted "decisions on the merits"
75. See, e.g., Gonsalves, 727 F.2d at 29 n.3 ("The fact that the Rhode Island superior court
reversed the decision of the RICHR on the basis of the administrative record does not detract
from the preclusive effect to be accorded that court's decision."); Unger, 693 F.2d at 706
("[Plaintiffs] contention is that a prior judgment can have preclusive effect only if it was a
decision on the very question presented to the second court.").
76. See generally San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323,
335 n. 14 (2005) (noting the requirements of issue preclusion, one of which demands "a final
judgment on the merits in the prior case"); see also Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. No.
401, 207 P.3d 1008, 1020 (Idaho 2009) (acknowledging five elements to determine whether issue
preclusion applies, one of which is "a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation");
McDaniel v. State, 208 P.3d 817, 825-26 (Mont. 2009) (describing the four-part -test for
determining the applicability of issue preclusion, the second step of which requires "a final
judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication"); Cronan v. Iwon, 972 A.2d 172, 174-75 (R.I.
2009) (providing that collateral estoppel is triggered when "the previous proceeding resulted in a
final judgment on the merits"); cf Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497,
501-03 (2001) (recognizing that even though the common understanding that "all judgments
denominated 'on the merits' are entitled to claim-preclusive effect" meant that there is a direct
relation between the substance of the claims, there is an ongoing shift realizing that the phrase
maintains a broader meaning and applies to judgments that are not directly based on the
substantive merits of a claim).
77. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 479.
78. Id. at 480-81 n.21.
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under New York law.79 The Court then summarized its view of the governing
legal principle in broadly applicable terms: "[i]t is well established that judicial
affirmance of an administrative determination is entitled to preclusive
effect., 80 Thus, the Court came down firmly on the side of preclusion, stating
its conclusion with sufficient breadth to foreclose distinction on the basis of the
standard of review in most cases.
8 1
Subsequent lower-court decisions reflect the limited viability of attempts to
avoid Kremer preclusion by reference to the degree of deference afforded
under the reviewing state's law. The decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp. affords
an example. The plaintiff in Unger sought administrative review in the Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois, after that state's Fair Employment Practices
Commission rejected her sex discrimination claims. 82 The federal district court
initially rejected the defendant's contention that res judicata barred the
plaintiff's related Title VII suit; however, when the Seventh Circuit took up the
issue shortly after the Supreme Court decided Kremer, it reversed.83 Relevant
to that determination was the court's analysis of Unger's argument that Kremer
did not apply because the Illinois courts afford greater deference to
84administrative decisions than do the courts of New York. The plaintiff
contended that Kremer preclusion did not apply because "the Illinois courts'
review, being deferential, was a review of the administrative proceeding and
thus did not constitute a finding one way or the other as to whether she was a
victim of discrimination." 85 The court rejected this argument, explaining that
the standard of review in Illinois does not differ in any significant respect from
86the standard applicable in New York. The court ultimately concluded not
only that the standards of review in Illinois and New York are similar, but also
87that both are deferential. This seems to suggest that differential deference
will rarely, if ever, afford a basis to avoid Kremer's import.
After engaging in a specific comparison of the New York and Illinois laws,
the court offered a broader basis for rejecting plaintiff's argument by
characterizing the Kremer decision as foreclosing it in most cases. The court
stated:
Further, there are at least two reasons for rejecting any argument
directed to the absence of a state court de novo trial or some
79. Id.
80. Id. at 481 n.21.
81. Id. at 481-82 nn.21-22.
82. Unger v. Consol. Foods Corp., 693 F.2d 703, 704 (7th Cir. 1982).
83. Id. at 704-05, 711.
84. Id. at 706-07.
85. Id. at 706.
86. Id. at 706-07 ("We do not, however, discern any practical difference in the standards of
review applied by the Illinois and New York courts.").
87. Id.
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"decision on the merits" equivalent. First, the Supreme Court has
already done so; the Kremer Court was fully aware that the New
York state courts were conducting an administrative review of a state
agency proceeding. Second, Unger's argument proves too much: by
her logic, no state court administrative review decision would have
to be accorded preclusive effect by the federal courts regardless of
whether that state's courts would do so. That, however, would be
clearly inconsistent with Section 1738 which is the statutory version
of the full faith and credit clause.
88
Thus, the Seventh Circuit agreed that Kremer left little room for argument on
the basis of standard of review.
Finally, a well-established principle of even broader application suggests
that this standard of review argument will likely fail in most cases. The
essence of the Court's holding in Kremer is that federal courts must respect
state-court judgments on closely related employment-discrimination claims.8 9
Title VII does not repeal § 1738, so its full-faith-and-credit command applies.90
As such, the preclusive effect of a state-court administrative appeal should turn
on the preclusion law of that state. How the standard of administrative review
differs in that particular state from the one evaluated in Kremer is immaterial. 91
The only question is whether the courts of the state that rendered the judgment
would deem it preclusive, and the answer to that question lies primarily in the
law of that state. 92 Therefore, it is unlikely that Kremer's import is avoidable
on that basis.
C. Inherent Limitations
The foregoing discussion suggests that Kremer preclusion is nearly absolute
and will apply in most cases. The decision does, however, carve out two
exceptions. This Article refers to these exceptions as "inherent limitations,"
88. Id at 707 (emphasis added).
89. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 471-72 (1982).
90. Id. at 470-73.
91. See Unger, 693 F.2d at 707 n.7 (suggesting that the Kremer majority's discussion of
differential deference was unnecessary because "[g]iven that the majority Justices found no
support in the legislative history of Title VII for a partial repeal of Section 1738, a federal court
should be foreclosed from inquiring into the nature of the state court decision if the state would
grant it preclusive effect and assuming the due process concerns noted above were satisfied").
92. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466-67 ("There is no question that th[e] judicial determination
[on review from the NYHRD] precludes Kremer from bringing 'any other action, civil or
criminal, based upon the same grievance' in the New York courts. By its terms, therefore, § 1738
would appear to preclude Kremer from relitigating the same question in federal court." (citation
omitted) (quoting N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 300 (McKinney 2009))); discussion infra Part IV.B
(addressing potential bases for rejecting preclusion even if the law of the state that rendered the
judgment would afford it); see also Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S.
373, 381 (1985) ("Kremer indicates that § 1738 requires a federal court to look first to state
preclusion law in determining the preclusive effects of a state court judgment.").
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because their applicability depends on the circumstances of the case. These
limitations differ from those discussed in the preceding two sections because
there is little debate about their existence--courts are in virtually unanimous
agreement that Kremer does not apply when these limitations come into play.
Even so, a review of applicable case law demonstrates that situations in which
these limitations might affect the outcome are rare.
The first inherent limitation arises directly from Kremer's holding. Kremer
directs federal courts to give full faith and credit to state-court judgments,
which implies that preclusion operates only when the law of the state that
rendered the judgment says that it should.9 3 The root of its variable application
is therefore plain: whether a judgment deserves preclusive effect or not turns
on the law of that jurisdiction. As such, any judgment unworthy of preclusive
effect under the law of the rendering jurisdiction would not bind the federal
courts. State preclusion law is complicated, somewhat unpredictable, and
often indeterminate; however, the result in lower-court cases applying Kremer
remains quite uniform in favor of preclusion. A review of the relevant case
law did not reveal any case in which a federal court, heeding Kremer's advice,
declined to give preclusive effect to a state-court judgment reviewing
administrative proceedings on the ground that the law of the rendering state so
dictates. Instead, all of the principal cases applying the Kremer rule ultimately
concluded that preclusion should apply, at least to some extent.94 Thus, this
broad limitation does not affect the application of Kremer preclusion in most
cases.
The second inherent limitation is hardly less debatable. No judgment
rendered in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
guarantees-whether under anti-discrimination law or in any other context-is
entitled to preclusive effect. 95 As with the first limitation, the Court in Kremer
also made the second limitation abundantly clear and left little room to
question its existence. Indeed, this limitation is constitutionally sourced and
compelled-notwithstanding § 1738, Kremer preclusion does not apply if the
93. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466; see also Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (1 1th Cir.
1999) ("A state court's decision upholding an administrative body's findings has preclusive effect
in a subsequent federal court proceeding if. . . the courts of that state would be bound by the
decision .... ).
94. Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1368; Zanders v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d 1127,
1132 (6th Cir. 1990); Trujillo v. County of Santa Clara, 775 F.2d 1359, 1364 (9th Cir. 1985);
Hirst v. California, 770 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1985); Hickman v. Elec. Keyboarding, Inc., 741
F.2d 230, 232 (8th Cir. 1984); Bumey v. Polk Cmty. Coll., 728 F.2d 1374, 1378 (1 1th Cir. 1984);
Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 727 F.2d 27, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1984); Wakeen v. Hoffman
House Inc., 724 F.2d 1238, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 1983); Unger, 693 F.2d at 706-07. This discussion
does not include those cases to be discussed infra, in which the courts permitted a plaintiffs
federal claims to proceed-even after final adjudication of related state claims-on the grounds
that he sought different relief in the federal court than in the statp proceedings. See infra Part IV
(discussing cases in which plaintiff seeks different relief in federal proceedings).
95. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-83.
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state proceedings did not comport with due process. 96  The Kremer Court
acknowledged the importance of this limitation, referring to it as a "serious
contention" and dedicating several pages of discussion to it.9 7 But a review of
the pertinent case law did not reveal any case in which the court declined to
give a judgment preclusive effect on grounds it failed to comport with due
process; to the contrary, those courts that addressed a due-process concern
found the proceedings sufficient in each instance. 98 The inherent limitations
therefore offer little maneuvering room by way of attempts to avoid Kremer's
reach.
IV. UNRAVELING THE THIRD THREAD: THE AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE
REMEDIES
The entanglement of the web becomes even more profound when questions
of additional relief arise. This thread thus presents the hairiest issues on the
web, as it includes those cases in which the plaintiff prevailed at the state or
local administrative level-with or without a state-court judgment approving
the administrative findings-and subsequently sought alternative relief in a
federal suit on the same claims. The web entanglement is exacerbated by
substantial disagreement among the courts about the governing decisional
framework and the lack of any clear guidance from the Supreme Court. Some
courts decide these cases without regard to preclusion principles, focusing
instead on the availability of a statutory basis for the suit under Title VII.
9
Other courts disregard these questions of statutory authority in favor of
96. Id. at 480-82.
97. Id at 480-85.
98. See, e.g., Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1368; Trujillo, 775 F.2d at 1368-69. "Pertinent" here
means, roughly, that the cases arose from circumstances similar to those in the cases discussed
elsewhere in this section-federal-court suits brought by plaintiffs who previously pursued
related claims in state administrative and judicial proceedings in which one party sought to
invoke preclusion on the basis of the prior state-court judgment.
99. See, e.g., Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that Title VII's
jurisdictional grant does not reach independent actions seeking only attorney's fees and costs
incurred in administrative proceedings); Jones v. Am. State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 497 (8th Cir.
1988) (determining that Title VII's fee-shifting provision permits suits to recover only attorney's
fees and costs incurred in administrative proceedings); Porter v. Winter, No. CV F 06-0880 LJO
SMS, 2007 WL 708562, at *3, *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2007) (dismissing a Title VII suit seeking
only attorney's fees for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); Hansson v. Norton, 315 F. Supp. 2d
40, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2004), vacated, 411 F.3d 231 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (concluding that court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction in Title VII suit seeking only attorney's fees and discussing both Title
VII's fee-shifting provision and its jurisdictional grant); Cassas v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 39 F. Supp.
2d 389, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (permitting plaintiff to make claim for attorney's fees only
under Title VII's fee-shifting provision but concluding that plaintiff is not entitled to them on the
facts of the case); Paz v. Long Island R.R. Co., 954 F. Supp. 62, 64-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding
that Title Vll's fee-shifting provision does not support an independent suit for fees incurred in
state-court discrimination suit), aft'd, 128 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1997).
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preclusion principles.1°  Still other courts address both. 1° 1 The result is a
knotty snarl of case law that offers little instruction to future litigants and
judges. The disagreement among the courts has festered for years and is ripe
for Supreme Court resolution. This Part attempts to unfurl the knot by
untangling the quagmire of statutory and case law and suggesting the
applicable rules by which future additional-remedy cases should be resolved.
A. Statutory Authority
Courts commonly rely on the statute (Title VII) to decide the additional-
remedies suits that comprise this part of the web. There are several potential
explanations for the prevalence of this theory. First, it is beyond cavil that a
court should first look to the language of the statute to answer questions
pertaining to the statute's scope.' 2 Once the question is characterized as one
of statutory authority, the statute inevitably becomes the first source of
inquiry. ° 3 Notwithstanding the relative dearth of pertinent Supreme Court
precedent in this area, the most recent case on point engaged in statutory
analysis.10 4 Judges and litigants looking to the Supreme Court for direction are
therefore likely to take a similar path. Finally, a statutory analysis is
appealing, because it offers the possibility of a more concrete rationale.
Accordingly, it is common for courts to resolve disputes about the viability of
a suit for additional remedies after resolution of discrimination claims in the
state system by reference to Title VII.
While the majority of courts addressing these issues seem to agree that the
statute should govern, there is no consensus about which provision controls.
Some courts treat the problem as one of subject-matter jurisdiction, governed
by the provision that authorizes the district courts to hear Title VII claims.
10 5
100. Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 856-58 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that a policy-
based exception to the claim-preclusion doctrine applied so plaintiff could proceed even though
his Title VII claims were transactionally related to claims fully adjudicated in state court).
101. Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 70-72 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the district
court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Title VII suit seeking compensatory and punitive
damages and attorney's fees not recovered in prior state proceedings and that the claims were not
precluded by prior state judgment).
102. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975).
103. Whether the question is best addressed as one of statutory inquiry is a separate question
that will be addressed infra Part IV.
104. N.C. Dep't ofTransp. v. Crest St. Cmty. Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1986).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2006); see, e.g., Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir.
2000) ("[T]he jurisdictional grant of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) does not extend to an independent
action solely for attorney's fees and costs incurred during the course of the Title VII
administrative process."); Porter v. Winter, No. CV F 06-0880 LJO SMS, 2007 WL 708562, at *6
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2007) (concluding that Title VII's jurisdictional grant does not confer
"jurisdiction to adjudicate solely a claim for attorney's fees without a claim of a substantive
violation of Title VII"); Morgan v. N.C. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 421 F. Supp. 2d 890,
897-98 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (applying holding of Chris v. Tenet and concluding that court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over fees-only suit).
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Other courts-particularly those in which the plaintiff seeks only an award of
attorney's fees, as opposed to some other forms of additional relief-focus
instead on Title VII's fee-shifting provision, which authorizes the court to
award fees to the prevailing party.1 6 Still other courts engage in a hybrid
analysis, mentioning one or both of the pertinent statutory provisions without
clarifying which one controls.10 7 However, neither provision offers an entirely
satisfactory response to this legal question.
1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Provision
Title VII's jurisdictional grant confers upon the district courts the power to
adjudicate "actions brought under this subchapter." 10 8  The referenced
"subchapter," commonly referred to as "Title VII," is subchapter VII of title 42
of the United States Code, entitled "Equal Employment Opportunities."
Critical to understanding the parameters of the subject-matter jurisdiction
objection is identification of the context in which it might arise. The cases that
turn upon the interpretation of this provision typically do not involve contests
about whether the employer unlawfully discriminated or retaliated against the
employee, because those determinations were made at the administrative level.
Instead, subject-matter jurisdiction problems tend to arise in those cases
seeking additional relief in federal court-relief that for one reason or another
was not available or awarded in the prior state proceedings.1
0 9
A common form of additional relief is attorney's fees. 110 Plaintiffs who
prevailed in state administrative proceedings may have received compensation
for their injuries; however, they may not have recovered attorney's fees if the
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); see, e.g., Jones v. Am. State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 497-99 (8th
Cir. 1988) (concluding that the fee-shifting provision authorized a federal suit seeking only those
attorney's fees incurred in administrative proceedings under Title VII); Paz v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 954 F. Supp. 62, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) does not permit a party to sue
for attorney's fees incurred in a state action for employment discrimination when that action is
unrelated to any claim brought under Title VII."), aff'd, 128 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1997).
107. See Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 67, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing the fee-
shifting provision but referring to the problem as jurisdictional without reference to the subject-
matter-jurisdiction provision); Hansson v. Norton, 315 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing
both provisions as the basis for its conclusion that the court lacks jurisdiction over a fees-only
suit), vacated, 411 F.3d 231 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
109. See Nestor, 466 F.3d at 68-69 (assessing the viability of claims to recover attorney's
fees, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages incurred in conjunction
with discrimination claims resolved in state proceedings); Chris, 221 F.3d at 649 (adjudicating
claim for attorney's fees incurred in administrative proceedings); Porter, 2007 WL 708562, at *3
(ruling on a motion to dismiss claim for attorney's fees and costs); Morgan, 421 F. Supp. 2d at
893-94 (evaluating a jurisdictional objection to a Title VII suit seeking only attorney's fees and
costs).
110. Chris, 221 F.3d at 651; Porter, 2007 WL 708562, at *1; Morgan, 421 F. Supp. 2d at
893; Hansson, 315 F. Supp. 2d at 41.
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pertinent law did not include a fee-shifting provision. 11 Indeed, the subject-
matter jurisdiction argument is best suited to cases seeking only attorney's fees
because of the nature of the determination involved. Resolution of a claim for
fees typically will not, and need not, approach the merits of the underlying
wrong. The availability of the claimed fees turns upon the applicability of the
pertinent legal or contractual provision and not on proof of the claim that
necessitated incurring the fees. Thus, if the Title VII plaintiff seeks a form of
relief other than fees, the court's subject-matter jurisdiction is less in doubt
because resolution of damages claims will necessitate substantive analysis.
112
Assessment of the fees claim, however, will not require the same analysis.
1 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit illustrated this
concept in Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney. 114 In Nestor, the plaintiff prevailed on
her employment-discrimination claims at the state administrative level, and the
state trial and appellate courts affirmed those findings." 5 The pertinent state
law permitted recovery of back pay, which the plaintiff received, but it did not
offer emotional distress awards, attorney's fees, or punitive damages. 16 The
plaintiff subsequently brought a federal suit under Title VII seeking those
additional remedies.' 7  In addition to its preclusion defense, the defendant
contended that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
"damages-only" suit. 1  The court rejected the jurisdiction argument,
reasoning that even if Title VII does not authorize a fees-only suit, 119 it
nevertheless condones a suit like plaintiffs that "entails litigation of
substantive issues: for example, whether Nestor suffered any emotional
distress caused by Pratt's discrimination and whether Pratt's conduct was
malicious."'
120
111. Chris, 221 F.3d at 650 (considering a claim for attorney's fees after plaintiff received
compensation for alleged discrimination via confidential settlement); Morgan, 421 F. Supp. 2d at
892-93 (assessing a claim for attorney's fees and costs under Title VII after plaintiff prevailed in
state administrative proceedings on related state discrimination claims); Hansson, 315 F. Supp. 2d
at 41-44 (evaluating the viability of a claim for attorney's fees incurred in administrative pursuit
of discrimination claims that were resolved through a settlement).
112. See, e.g., Nestor, 466 F.3d at 69-70 (rejecting a subject-matter-jurisdiction objection
because the plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages in addition to fees, which would
involve consideration of alleged unlawful conduct).
113. See, e.g., Chris, 221 F.3d at 653 (concluding that Title VII's subject-matter-jurisdiction
provision "limits the complainant to claiming fees and costs solely in the forum where the
substantive claims are ultimately resolved").





119. Id. at 69-70. The court specifically declined to decide whether Title VII permits a fees-
only suit. Id. at 70 n. 4 .
120. Id. at 70.
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The limitation suggested by Nestor makes sense. If the jurisdiction
argument prevails, it must be confined to those cases that do not approach the
merits of the alleged Title VII violation. The plain statutory language dictates
this result. Section 2000e-5(f)(3) confers upon the district courts jurisdiction
to hear "actions brought under [Title VII]."'12  As will be discussed in more
detail below, the plain language of this provision suggests that jurisdiction is
proper only when the suit entails adjudication of claims implicating the
substance of Title VII, such as suits alleging discrimination or retaliation. 22 A
suit that seeks compensatory or punitive damages usually necessitates such
analysis; however, a suit for fees alone does not. Thus, Title VII's
jurisdictional grant likely extends to cases seeking relief in addition to that
obtained in prior proceedings, so long as resolution of the claims will require
proof of facts constituting unlawful discrimination or retaliation.
The court's subject-matter jurisdiction is more vulnerable in cases seeking
only fees and costs. The problem flows primarily from the statutory language.
The Supreme Court has not addressed this question squarely, and its pertinent
precedents leave room for argument on both sides of the issue. 123 This Part
will delve into the statutory analysis and the Supreme Court precedents to
illuminate the debate. It will ultimately conclude that Title VII's jurisdictional
grant does not afford a satisfactory resolution to the problem of suits seeking
additional relief.
a. The "Plain and Unambiguous " Interpretation of the Jurisdictional
Grant
The well-established rules of statutory interpretation begin with an
examination of the pertinent provision to determine if its meaning is plain and
unambiguous. 2 4 Plain and unambiguous statutes must be enforced as written
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2006).
122. See infra Part IV.A.I.a (engaging in statutory analysis of Title VII's subject-matter
provision).
123. See infra Part IV.A.l.c.
124. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (indicating that if the language
is unambiguous then the inquiry is complete); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340
(1997) (same); see also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:2 (7th ed. 2007) (collecting cases to support the proposition
that "'[w]here the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of
interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no
discussion' (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917))). The Supreme
Court is somewhat infamous for talking out of both sides of its mouth on this point. The Court
has often stated that the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to apply the plain and
unambiguous meaning if it can be discerned. See, e.g., Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 98 (stating rule
and purporting to apply it); Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340 (same). A deeper inquiry, however, would
likely reveal that the plainness inquiry itself is tainted by the ultimate outcome that the Court
desires to reach. A probing analysis of that problem lies beyond the scope of this Article, but it is
nevertheless a point well worth noting.
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without reference to external sources. 125 Both the language of the statute and
the context in which it appears are pertinent to the plainness or ambiguity of
the statute.1
26
Title VII's jurisdictional grant confers upon the district courts the power to
adjudicate "actions brought under this subchapter [Title VII].,, 127 The initial
statutory interpretation question is thus whether the terms "actions brought
under" are plain and unambiguous. More specifically, does the language
"actions brought under" contemplate only civil lawsuits seeking to enforce the
substantive rights conferred by Title VII, or does it encompass fees-only suits
as well?
The principal cases addressing this question largely agree that the statute is
plainly and unambiguously limited to suits that claim substantive Title VII
violations.128  The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Chris v. Tenet leads this charge and includes the most
detailed analysis of the issue. 12 9 Relying primarily on dictionary definitions,
that court interpreted the terms "actions brought under this subchapter" to
mean "legal proceedings in a court of law to enforce the substantive rights
guaranteed by Title VII, specifically the right to be free from employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
' 13 °
The court supported its conclusion by referencing the context in which the
jurisdictional grant appears.1 31 Specifically, the court noted that the sentences
following the jurisdictional grant make venue in Title VII actions proper by
reference to "facts associated with the alleged unlawful employment
practice. ' 32  As such, the court concluded that the words "action[] under"
must mean an action containing allegations of "discrimination or
retaliation."1 33 Further, the court noted that Congress used the term "action"
throughout Title VII and that it is "consistently used to refer to a court
125. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485.
126. Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 652 (4th Cir. 2000).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2006).
128. Chris, 221 F.3d at 652-53; see also Porter v. Winter, No. CV F 06-0880 LJO SMS,
2007 WL 708562, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2007); Morgan v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 421 F. Supp. 2d 890, 897 (W.D.N.C. 2006); Hansson v. Norton, 315 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46
(D.D.C. 2004), vacated, 411 F.3d 231 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
129. Chris, 221 F.3d at 652.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Title VII venue is proper where unlawful employment practice is alleged, where the
employment records relevant to the alleged unlawful employment practice are maintained, where
the aggrieved party would have worked absent the alleged unlawful employment practice, or, if
the defendant is not found in any of these places, where it has its principal office. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(3).
133. Chris, 221 F.3d at 652-53 (alteration in original) (citing Chris v. Tenet, 57 F. Supp. 2d
330, 336 (E.D. Va. 1999)).
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proceeding to prevent or remedy an unlawful employment practice."1 34 The
court offered little further support for this conclusory assertion.
Other courts that have reached the same conclusion have relied primarily on
the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Chris without addressing the jurisdictional-
grant issue independently.1 35  Courts that have rejected subject-matter
jurisdiction challenges in this context have usually done so on alternative
grounds. For example, the Second Circuit in Nestor found that a jurisdictional
barrier did not exist on the grounds that the plaintiffs suit sought
compensatory and punitive damages, the availability of which would turn upon
an analysis of substantive issues regarding the defendant's alleged
"discriminatory conduct and its consequences."' 136 In Jones v. American State
Bank, the Eighth Circuit decided that the plaintiff could proceed on her fees-
only Title VII suit under the authority of the fee-shifting provision without
reference to the jurisdictional grant on which the Chris decision and those that
have followed it relied.1 37 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Chris remains
the seminal authority for evaluation of jurisdiction objections in additional-
remedy (primarily fees-only) suits. However, the Fourth Circuit's analysis is
unsatisfactory not only as a matter of strict statutory interpretation, but also in
light of the relevant Supreme Court precedents and the applicable body of law.
b. Problems with the Plainness Conclusion
Notwithstanding widespread agreement with the Fourth Circuit's conclusion
that Title VII's jurisdictional grant is plain and unambiguous in its exclusion of
fees-only suits, a closer look reveals that the opposite interpretation is equally
plausible. First, a fees-only suit provisioned under the authority of Title VII's
fee-shifting provision is no less of an "action under" Title VII than a suit that
focuses on substantive discrimination claims. Instead of arising under the core
provisions of the statute that prohibit discrimination and retaliation,13 the suitarises under the fee-shifting provision.1 39 It is, however, no less of an "action
134. Id. at 652-53.
135. Porter v. Winter, No. CV F 06-0880 LJO SMS, 2007 WL 708562, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 2, 2007); Morgan v. N.C. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 421 F. Supp. 2d 890, 896-98
(W.D.N.C. 2006). But see Hansson v. Norton, 315 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46-51 (D.D.C. 2004)
(discussing Chris and engaging in minimal, independent statutory analysis and concluding
summarily that "the plain language of [Title VII's jurisdictional grant] seems to indicate that
'actions brought under this subchapter' refers to court proceedings to enforce the rights
guaranteed, or redress the wrongs prohibited, by Title VII"), vacated, 411 F.3d 231 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
136. Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2006).
137. 857 F.2d 494, 497-99 (8th Cir. 1988) (permitting a fees-only suit under authority of
Title VII's fee-shifting provision).
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), 2000e-3(a) (2006) (noting the core prohibitions against
discrimination and retaliation).
139. Id. § 2000e-5(k). See infra Part IV.A.2 for a discussion of whether the fee-shifting
provision itself authorizes an independent action.
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under" Title VII. Moreover, the statutory context does not necessarily compel
the conclusion that the Chris court reached. Simply because the statute makes
the propriety of venue turn upon facts relating to the underlying "unlawful
employment practice" does not mean that the claim must involve a
determination of those issues. 14°  At a minimum, both interpretations are
equally plausible. The conclusions that the Fourth Circuit reached are not
without foundation, but the opposite result is also supportable. As such, the
rules of statutory interpretation necessitate further examination of the issue.
When the statutory language is neither plain nor unambiguous, one must
attempt to discern the intent of the drafters to determine the provision's
meaning. 141  Potential sources used in statutory interpretation of this kind
include legislative history, pertinent policy goals, and considerations of
reasonableness. 142 These authorities likewise reveal no clear answer. As the
Chris court stated, Title VII "reflects a congressional intent to use
administrative conciliation as the primary means of handling claims, thereby
encouraging quicker, less formal, and less expensive resolution of disputes." 1
As such, interpreting the jurisdictional grant "as permitting a suit solely for
attorney's fees and costs incurred during the course of the Title VII
administrative process would run counter to the congressional aim of quick,
less formal, and less expensive resolution of employment disputes."',44 On the
other hand, as the Nestor court pointed out, Title VII also reflects a
congressional goal of affording complete relief to victims of discrimination.
145
140. See, e.g., Nestor, 466 F.3d at 69 (holding that res judicata does not preclude the court
from having subject-matter jurisdiction over an action for attorney's fees under a Title VII action
without ruling on the substance of the underlying action); Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 649-53
(4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over an
action for attorney's fees in two separate sex-discrimination actions under Title VII, but declining
to rule on those discrimination actions).
141. See 2A SINGER& SINGER, supra note 124, §§ 45:2, :5.
142. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (referencing
"text, structure, purpose, and history of the ADEA" as interpretive resources supporting the
conclusion that the ADEA is not intended to prohibit an employer from favoring older workers
over younger ones); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345-46 (1997) (turning to both "the
broader context provided by other sections of the statute" and the statute's purposes to resolve
ambiguity as to the meaning of the term "employees" in the anti-retaliation provision of Title
VII); 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 124, § 45:13 (identifying the following as resources for
interpretation: statutory language and context, legislative history and underlying policy, and
concepts of reasonableness); Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Adding Subjective Fuel to the Vague-
Standard Fire: A Proposal for Congressional Intervention After Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 533, 570-72 & nn.233-37 (2007) (discussing
the statutory interpretation framework); Taylor, supra note 23, at 116-26 (discussing the statutory
interpretation framework).
143. Chris, 221 F.3d at 653.
144. Id.
145. Nestor, 466 F.3d at 71-72 (citing N.Y. Gas Light Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 65-
68 (1980)); Clarke v. Frank, No. 88 CV 1900 (JLC), 1991 WL 99211, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 17,
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A fees-only suit could promote this goal by affording an opportunity to recover
fees that were not available in administrative proceedings; thus, the prevailing
plaintiff's relief would be complete-from a Title VII standpoint-only if he
recovered the fees award that the statute provides.'
46
These lines of reasoning have some appeal. On the one hand, permitting a
fees-only suit is inefficient and counterproductive to the conciliatory and cost-
reduction goals reflected in Title VII. On the other hand, a fees-only suit may
be the only opportunity that a plaintiff has to recoup the substantial cost he
incurred in vindicating his rights. In many Title VII cases, the fees award will
far exceed any damages recovered. 147 This foray into the minds of Title VII's
drafters leaves one unsure as to whether the subject-matter jurisdiction
provision encompasses a fees-only suit.
148
c. Supreme Court Precedents
The pertinent Supreme Court precedents do not provide a direct answer.
The Court addressed a closely related question nearly thirty years ago in New
York Gas Light Club, Inc. v. Carey.149 The Carey plaintiff prevailed on her
race-discrimination claims in state administrative proceedings and received
back pay and an offer of employment as a waitress.15  While the defendant's
appeal to the state courts was pending, the plaintiff received a right-to-sue
notice from the EEOC, and she filed a federal suit claiming discrimination
under Title VII and other civil-rights statutes. 151 After the defendant exhausted
its appeals in the state courts, the parties agreed that the plaintiffs suit could be
dismissed; however, she could continue to pursue her request for attorney's
fees.152  The district court denied the fee request, and the Second Circuit
reversed, ruling that Title VII permits a suit solely to recover fees under these
1991) ("The goal of Title VII remedies is to make people whole for injuries suffered as a result of
unlawful discrimination." (citing Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1333 (6th Cir. 1988))).
146. Clarke, 1991 WL 99211, at *3.
147. See, e.g., Brandau v. Kansas, 168 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that the
plaintiff was awarded $1 in nominal damages and $41,598.13 in attorney's fees-an award
confirmed by the court of appeals); Gumbhir v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 157 F.3d 1141, 1146-
47 (8th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that the district court awarded the plaintiff $110,000 in
attorney's fees and $4,423.20 in lost wages, but reducing the award of attorney's fees to $46,750,
which still exceeded the lost wages recovered); Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1209,
1211 (3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing the magistrate's award to the plaintiff of $473,953.45 for pain
and suffering and $546,379.59 in attorney's fees and concluding that award of attorney's fees
could exceed the damages award).
148. This discussion is cursory because, as will be discussed infra, the question is ultimately
moot. The broader grant of jurisdiction on the district courts to hear cases involving federal
questions should encompass these suits. See infra Part IV.A.I.d (discussing federal question
jurisdiction over fees-only suits).
149. 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
150. Jd. at 57.
151. Id. at 58.
152. Id. at 59.
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circumstances. 153 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, framing the question
as "whether, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a federal court
may allow the prevailing party attorney's fees for legal services performed in
prosecuting an employment discrimination claim in state administrative and
judicial proceedings that Title VII requires federal claimants to invoke."'
154
The Court answered that question in the affirmative, allowing a plaintiff to
proceed in a Title VII fees-only suit.
155
At first blush, it may appear that the Court's decision in Carey conclusively
answered this question by interpreting Title VII to "authorize a federal-court
action to recover an award of attorney's fees for work done" in state
administrative proceedings. 156  A closer look, however, reveals Carey's
limitations. First, the Court gave no consideration to Title VII's jurisdictional
grant. While the Court cited the provision of the statute in which the
jurisdictional grant appears, it neither specifically referenced, nor discussed,
the jurisdiction provision. 57 Rather than framing the issue as a jurisdictional
question, the Court focused on the fee-shifting provision of Title VII,
concluding that it authorizes an independent fees-only suit. 58  Thus, the
Court's decision in Carey at most answered only whether the fee-shifting
provision supported such an independent suit; it said nothing at all about Title
VII's jurisdictional grant. Indeed, the Court never made even a passing
reference to the jurisdictional question. The Court's only references to the
term "jurisdiction" pertain to the EEOC's authority relative to the state
153. Id. at 60.
154. Id. at 56.
155. Id. at 71.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 58-67. The Court referenced section 706(f) of Title VII, which is codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), in its final statement of its holding: "In sum, we conclude that §§ 706(f) and
706(k) of Title VII authorize a federal-court action to recover an award of attorney's fees for
work done by the prevailing complainant in state proceedings .... " Id. at 70. The Court was
likely focused on paragraph (1) of section 706(f), as the Court cites section 706(0(1) several
times in its decision. Id. at 58 (citing section 706(0(1) as requiring the EEOC to issue a right-to-
sue letter); id. at 63 n.3 (noting that the statute allows a "court [to] stay 'further proceedings'
pending the termination of'State or local proceedings"' (citing 42 U.S.C. § 706(0(1) (2006))); id.
at 65 ("After an additional 30 days, the EEOC is authorized to bring an action, in which the
complainant has an absolute right to intervene." (citing 42 U.S.C. § 706(f))); id. at 66 ("Since it is
clear that Congress intended to authorize fee awards for work done in administrative proceedings,
we must conclude that § 706(f)(1)'s authorization of a civil suit in federal court encompasses a
suit solely to obtain an award of attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local
proceedings."); id. at 66 n.6 ("Section 706(0(1) requires the EEOC to give the complainant a
'right to sue' letter .... "); id. at 67 ("Title VII merely provides a supplemental right to sue in
federal court if satisfactory relief is not obtained in state forums." (citing 42 U.S.C. § 706(f)(1))).
The Court did not mention section 706(f)(3), which contains the jurisdictional grant, anywhere in
its discussion.
158. See Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 60-71 (analyzing at length Title VII's fee-shifting provision).
The fee-shifting provision is discussed infra in Part IV.A.2.
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agency. 159  Consequently, to conclude that Carey supports federal-court
jurisdiction over fees-only suits at best overstates its holding and perhaps
entirely misrepresents it.
The factual context in which Carey arose also limits its importance. The
Carey plaintiff filed her federal-court lawsuit while the defendant's state-court
appeal was pending; her initial complaint thus went beyond the typical fees-
only request by including substantive claims for relief under Title VII and
other civil-rights laws.' The parties agreed to dismiss the substantive claims
when the state appeals were completed, leaving only the fees request intact.16
1
Because the propriety of the Court's jurisdiction is measured on the face of the
plaintiff s complaint,' 62 there was hardly any doubt in Carey about the Court's
power over the case. The plaintiff asserted numerous substantive claims, any
one of which would have been sufficient to confer jurisdiction; thus, Carey did
not present a jurisdictional question at all. 163  Justice John Paul Stevens
expressly recognized this limitation in his concurring opinion and suggested
that the rule in fees-only suits at their inception should be different:
[I]t is useful to emphasize that this federal litigation was commenced
in order to obtain relief for respondent on the merits of her basic
dispute with petitioners, and not simply to recover attorney's fees.
Whether Congress intended to authorize a separate federal action
solely to recover costs, including attorney's fees, incurred in
obtaining administrative relief in either a deferral or a nondeferral
State is not only doubtful but is a question that is plainly not
presented by this record.
164
Justice Stevens's comments are suggestive, but are not, of course, binding
precedent, so the question of jurisdiction over a fees-only suit remained open.
More recently, the Court decided North Carolina Department of
Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc., which likewise
provides instruction but offers no definitive answer to the looming question. 165
The plaintiffs in Crest Street were residents of a predominantly African-
American neighborhood in Durham, North Carolina. 166  When the North
Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) proposed a road-
construction project through the Crest Street community, which would displace
the community park and church and many of the neighborhood's residents, two
159. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 64-65.
160. Id. at 58.
161. Id. at 59.
162. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1908).
163. Carey, 447 U.S. at 58. As the Court notes, the procedural posture of the case was a bit
anomalous. The Court acknowledged the district-court judge's concern that the EEOC should not
have issued a right-to-sue letter while state proceedings remained pending. Id at 59.
164. Id. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring).
165. 479 U.S. 6 (1986).
166. Id. at 8.
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neighborhood associations filed a complaint with the United States Department
of Transportation (USDOT), alleging that the proposed highway-construction
project discriminated against Crest Street residents on the basis of race, in
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.167 The parties ultimately
settled their claims; however, a dispute arose about NCDOT's liability for
attorney's fees. 168 As a result, the plaintiffs filed a federal lawsuit seeking
attorney's fees under the fee-shifting statute applicable in Title VI cases-the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1988.169 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split
regarding the viability of a fees-only suit. 17 The Court concluded that § 1988
did not support an independent action to recover fees incurred in administrative
proceedings, basing its decision on the plain language of the statute as
reinforced by its legislative history.17 1 The statute permits an award of fees
only in an "'action or proceeding to enforce a provision of... [T]itle VI." and
does not authorize a fees-only suit.
172
Crest Street filled some of the gaps left by Carey, but its solution was not
comprehensive. Unlike Carey, Crest Street did not have an unusual procedural
posture. The federal lawsuit underlying the Crest Street decision began as one
seeking only attorney's fees. 73 However, the context of the case distinguishes
it from the Title VII cases with which this Article is concerned. The plaintiffs
in Crest Street sought to recover attorney's fees under § 1988; such fees were
incurred in the administrative pursuit of claims under Title VI before the
USDOT. 17 4  Crest Street thus arose under a different fee-shifting provision
pertinent to a different statute. Moreover, Crest Street, like Carey, did not
frame the issue in jurisdictional terms. Although the Court determined that §
1988 "does not authorize a court to award attorney's fees except in an action to
enforce the listed civil rights laws," it never used the term "jurisdiction" to
describe the issue.' 75 As such, whatever Crest Street may contribute to the
debate about additional-remedy suits, it does not answer the jurisdictional
problem directly. 1
76
167. Id. at 8-9 (noting that Title VII prohibits discrimination by programs receiving federal
funding).
168. Id. at 11; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
169. Crest Street, 479 U.S. at 11-12.
170. Id. at 11.
171. Id. at 12-14.
172. Id. at 12 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
173. Id. at 11-12 ("The case before us is not, and was never, an action to enforce any of [the
pertinent civil-rights] laws.").
174. Id. at 8-9, 11.
175. Id. at 12.
176. The import of the Crest Street decision for the question of statutory authority under the
fee-shifting provision will be addressed infra in Part IV.A.2.c.
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d. Evaluation: The Problem with the Jurisdiction Objection
The power of the district courts to decide claims seeking only attorney's fees
remains a matter of some debate among the lower courts. The Fourth Circuit
in Chris summarily concluded that Title VIi's jurisdictional grant does not
extend to cases seeking only fees and costs incurred in prior proceedings.'
77
Following the Fourth Circuit's lead, several district courts have reached the
same conclusion. 178 The Supreme Court has not confronted the question of
jurisdiction over fees-only suits under Title VII and, outside of that particular
context, offers conflicting instruction. The answer to the question, however,
may be quite simple. Indeed, this Article takes the position that-even without
regard to whether Title VII's specific jurisdictional grant applies 179-there can
be little doubt about the courts' power to decide such cases. The broad grant
of power to hear cases raising federal questions should serve as a catch-all.
Section 1331 of title 28 confers upon the district courts the power to hear all
cases involving federal questions. The grant is broad: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."' 80 Alternatively referred to as "arising
under" or "federal question" jurisdiction, this conferral of power includes all
cases in which federal law creates the cause of action.'
81
It seems beyond doubt that a suit to recover attorney's fees under Title VII
arises under federal law. The claim exists because Title VII creates it by
condoning fee awards to prevailing parties.!82 Without regard to whether Title
VII authorizes an independent fees-only suit, Congress's broad conferral of
federal-question jurisdiction must encompass it. 183 Remarkably, the plaintiff in
Chris never raised § 1331 as a potential source of the court's power to hear the
case, and it appears that neither the district judge nor the circuit judges ever
considered it.184 A suit to recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
177. Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 2000).
178. Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 67, 69 (2d Cir. 2006); Braswell v. Montgomery
County Dep't of Corr. and Rehab., 52 F. App'x 617, 619-20 (4th Cir. 2002); Morgan v. N.C.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 421 F. Supp. 2d 890, 897-98 (W.D.N.C. 2006); Taylor v.
Runyon, No. 90-2410-KHV, 2004 WL 303206, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 2, 2004).
179. This Article does not take a firm position as to whether Title VII's specific jurisdictional
grant applies in this context.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
181. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler, 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) ("A suit arises
under the law that creates the cause of action.").
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006).
183. The question of a court's statutory authority to decide such cases is discussed infra in
Part IV.A.2.
184. Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 649, 651-52, 655 (4th Cir. 2000); Chris v. Tenet, 57 F.
Supp. 2d 330, 331, 334-35, 340 (E.D. Va. 1999), arid, 221 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 2000). It is not at
all clear why this is so; however, the most likely explanation is that the court simply confused
jurisdiction with the existence of a claim. This confusion of terms likely contributed to the web
entanglement in the first place.
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5(k) arises under federal law; thus, the power of the district courts to hear such
cases is hardly debatable. There is no need to delve into exercises in statutory
interpretation because the federal-question statute affords a basis for
jurisdiction without regard to the applicability of Title VII's specific
jurisdictional grant.
2. Attorney's Fees Provision
The federal courts clearly have § 1331 jurisdiction to determine whether
Title VII creates a fees-only cause of action, but the question remains whether
such a claim exists. In other words, even if a court has jurisdiction over fees-
only suits, the case may nevertheless be subject to immediate dismissal if the
statute does not permit such suits in the first place.185 The question of statutory
authority focuses on Title VII's fee-shifting provision. Section 2000e-5(k) of
title 42 provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter
[Title VII] the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney's fee."' 86 For present purposes, the question is whether-
absent an accompanying claim of discrimination or retaliation-that statutory
provision permits an independent suit to recover fees.
a. Limited Adoption of the Fee-Provision Approach
The seminal authority adopting this approach is Jones v. American State
Bank. In Jones, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that a plaintiff could proceed in an independent federal suit to recover fees
, 187
under Title VII's fee-shifting provision. The plaintiff filed an EEOC charge
against her employer, alleging sex discrimination. 188 The EEOC referred the
charge to the South Dakota Division of Human Rights, as required under Title
VII, and the state agency awarded the plaintiff back pay, interest, and costs,
and ordered reinstatement.189 The state agency refused the plaintiffs request
for attorney's fees on the ground that they were unavailable under South
Dakota law.190 No appeals were filed, but the plaintiff brought a separate suit
in federal court to recover the attorney's fees that she incurred in the state
185. The key procedural distinction here is the device employed. A motion to dismiss for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) should be
denied on the grounds discussed in the preceding section because the court has jurisdiction
without regard to the applicability of Title VII's specific jurisdictional grant. See 28 U.S.C. §
1331; see also supra Part IV.A.I .d.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
187. Jones v. Am. State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 498-99 (8th Cir. 1988).
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administrative proceedings.1 91 The district court granted the fee request, and
the bank appealed.
192
The most notable feature of the Eighth Circuit's analysis is its cursory
reference to the fee-shifting provision of Title VII. 93  Although the court
referred to the issue in passing as one of jurisdiction, it never mentioned Title
VII's jurisdictional grant; rather, it treated the question as one of availability of
a cause of action under the fee-shifting provision. 94  As such, the Eighth
Circuit's approach differs somewhat markedly from that of the other courts
that treat the question as one of jurisdiction; indeed, it is these differences that
exacerbate the web entanglement and cause confusion, for not only do the
courts reach divergent outcomes in these additional-remedy cases, but they
also disagree on the decisional framework. 195
The Eighth Circuit's statutory-authority approach is far less pervasive than
the Fourth Circuit's jurisdictional approach; however, given the dubiousness of
the jurisdictional objection, it is not clear why this is so. On the other hand,
Jones has met with little agreement. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Chris
expressly repudiates Jones as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decisions
in Crest Street and Carey.1 96 In deciding Paz v. Long Island Railroad Co., the
Eastern District of New York followed an approach similar to that used by the
Jones court. In Paz, the court focused on the fee-shifting provision rather than
on the jurisdictional grant; however, the Paz court reached the opposite
conclusion, holding that Title VII did not support an independent suit for
fees. 197 Finally, in Hansson v. Norton, where no Title VII claim was raised in
the state proceedings, the District Court for the District of Columbia took a
hybrid approach, acknowledging both statutory provisions while also rejecting
the Jones court's conclusion and dismissing the plaintiffs fees-only suit.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit's statutory-authority approach is not a popular one.
Notwithstanding this unpopularity, the question remains whether the
statutory-authority approach adequately solves the additional-remedy puzzle.
As noted above, the matter is at least initially one of statutory interpretation,
and the same Supreme Court precedents once again must be examined.
191. Id. at 495-96.
192. Id at 496.
193. Id. at 497.
194. Id. at 496-97.
195. See supra Part IV.A. 1 (discussing cases that treat the issue as one ofjurisdiction).
196. Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 654-55 (4th Cir. 2000).
197. Paz v. Long Island R.R. Co., 954 F. Supp. 62, 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (dismissing a suit to
recover fees incurred in a state employment-discrimination case).
198. Hansson v. Norton, 315 F. Supp. 2d 40, 51 (D.D.C. 2004) ("The Court finds that the
plain language and purposes of Sections 706(0(3) and 706(k) comport more readily with the view
that an action solely for attorneys' fees, after an agreement between the parties has put to rest any
substantive Title VII dispute, is not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district
courts."), vacated, 411 F.3d 231 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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Ultimately, it appears that the statute does not permit such suits at all, and the
Supreme Court's decisions support this conclusion.
b. Statutory Analysis of the Fee Provision
Statutory interpretation begins with an inquiry into the plainness or
ambiguity of the language.' 99 A reexamination of the statute in question is
therefore imperative. The fee provision states: "In any action or proceeding
under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party
• . . a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs
. . . ,200 The question is whether this statute plainly permits or prohibits an
independent fees-only suit, or whether its mandate is ambiguous.
The primary focus of this inquiry is on the language "[i]n any action or
proceeding under this subchapter .. ,,201 Although the Jones court concluded
that these terms encompassed an independent suit, the court did not parse the
words in detail.2 2  Instead, the court focused on the term "proceedings,"
finding evidence in the legislative history that it is meant to include events at
203the state administrative level. The court therefore concluded that because
Title VII aims to provide complete relief for aggrieved parties, the fee
provision must permit a fees-only suit.
204
While this analysis offers the appeal of a foundation in the statutory
language, buttressed by reinforcement in the legislative goals and history, it is
nevertheless incomplete and inadequate. Regardless of whether or not the term
"proceedings" includes state administrative actions, it does not follow that the
statute provides for an independent suit. In other words, even if fees incurred
in state administrative proceedings are recoverable in a Title VII suit, those
fees may not be recoverable in an independent action without any underlying
substantive claim for relief. Interpretation of the term "proceedings" to include
state administrative actions therefore leaves unanswered the question of
whether attorney's fees may be recovered independently.
Contrary to the Jones court's conclusion, the plain statutory language
actually suggests that independent fees-only suits are precluded. The statute
provides that fees may be awarded "[i]n any action or proceeding under [Title
VII]. '20 5 As such, it permits the court to award fees in a Title VII action, but
does not authorize a suit solely for that purpose. If Congress desired that
199. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (discussing the rules of statutory
interpretation).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006).
201. Id.
202. Jones v. Am. State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 497-98 (8th Cir. 1988).
203. Id. at 497 ("Title VII uses the term 'proceedings' to describe the state action desired
under the system of deferrals, suggesting that state administrative proceedings were adequate
triggers for attorney's fees.").
204. Id. at 497-99.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
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result, it easily could have included language creating a fees-only suit; for
example, Congress could have added the clause "or an independent action
solely for that purpose" after the phrase quoted above. Instead, Congress
expressly provided that fees may only be recovered in a Title VII action, which
consists of a suit alleging discrimination or retaliation under 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2(a) or 2000e-3(a). 2" Title VII does not authorize an independent fees-
only suit on the basis of its plain language.0 7
Initially, it might appear that this conclusion contradicts the conclusion
reached above with respect to the meaning of the terms "action brought under"
in the subject-matter provision of Title VII. 20 8  However, the apparent
inconsistency does not exist. The jurisdiction provision confers upon the
district courts the power to hear cases brought under Title VII.a ° 9 That may
encompass an action under any provision of Title VII that authorizes a cause of
action; however, whether the fee provision authorizes a cause of action is an
entirely separate question. The fee provision allows for a recovery of fees in
Title VII actions, but does not itself create an independent cause of action for
that purpose. 2 0 Thus, Title VII's jurisdictional grant could encompass an
independent fees-only suit, but only if the statute created such a cause of
action. As discussed above, it does not appear to do so.
c. Supreme Court Precedents
Pertinent Supreme Court precedents support the conclusion that Title VII
does not authorize an independent fees-only suit. As noted above, although the
Court's decisions in Carey and Crest Street do not conclusively answer the
211jurisdictional question, they do represent the controlling law in this area.
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit relied directly on the Carey decision in reaching its
conclusion that Title VII authorizes a fees-only suit, but its reliance on Carey
206. Id. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a), 2000e-5(k).
207. The plain language of the statute also suggests that fees incurred in state administrative
proceedings are not recoverable at all. By providing for recovery of fees "in an action or
proceeding under [Title Vii]," the statute permits recovery of fees incurred in Title VII actions,
but not in actions under other laws, such as the anti-discrimination laws that give rise to state
administrative proceedings. Id. § 2000e-5(k) (emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court's
decision in New York Gas Light Club, Inc. v. Carey relied on a contrary conclusion. 447 U.S. 54,
63 (1980) ("The conclusion that fees are authorized for work done at the state and local levels is
inescapable."). Accepting the proposed view would depart from Supreme Court precedent and
perhaps even require overruling it. However, because the plain language suggests that the statute
does not encompass an independent fees-only suit, it is not necessary to wrestle with the Court's
decision in order to resolve this issue.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); see supra Part IV.A.I (discussing interpretations of Title
VII's jurisdictional grant).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
210. See id. § 2000e-5(k).
211. See supra Part IV.A.l.c.
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212
was misplaced. Moreover, that court failed to take sufficient account of
Crest Street.
The Supreme Court's decision in Carey does not answer whether Title VII
authorizes an independent fees-only suit because the plaintiff in that case
included Title VII discrimination claims in her original federal complaint.
213
Consequently, the case did not originate as a fees-only suit; it became a fees-
only suit when the parties agreed to dismiss all of the plaintiffs substantive
214claims. Thus, the Court's decision does not address whether Title VII
authorizes an independent fees action. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence,
expressly recognized this limitation on the Court's decision:
It is by no means clear that the statute, which merely empowers a
"court" to award fees, would authorize a fee allowance when there is
no need for litigation in the federal court to resolve the merits of the
underlying dispute .... In any event, the facts of this case present no
occasion for the Court's resolution of the issue.
215
The Court's decision simply did not approach the question of the propriety of a
fees-only suit.
The Court came closer to answering that question six years later in the Crest
Street decision in which the Court held that § 1988 does not authorize a fees-
only suit.216  Unfortunately, Crest Street does not provide a definitive
answer. 217 First, Crest Street arose under § 1988-the fee-shifting provision
generally applicable in federal civil-rights actions-rather than under § 2000e-
5(k), which is the provision specific to Title VII.21  While it is certainly
persuasive authority, the Court's decision in Crest Street does not necessarily
bind lower courts in Title VII cases. This is especially so because of the
important differences between Title VII and § 1988. Section 1988 authorizes a
court to award fees to the prevailing party "[i]n any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of... [T]itle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... ,,219
The statute explicitly provides that the action in which fee-shifting may occur
must be one "to enforce a provision of' one of the applicable civil-rights
220laws. Title VII, by contrast, refers only to "any action or proceeding under"
Title VII. 22 1 It is less explicit that the action must be one to enforce rights
212. Jones v. Am. State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 496-97 (8th Cir. 1988).
213. N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 58 (1980).
214. Id. at 59.
215. Id. at 72 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
216. N.C. Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Cmty. Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 15 (1986) ("Under
the plain language and legislative history of § 1988, however, only a court in an action to enforce
one of the civil rights laws listed in § 1988 may award attorney's fees.").
217. Id. at 12.
218. Id. at7.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
220. Id. (emphasis added).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006) (emphasis added).
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conferred thereunder. As such, one might argue that Crest Street leaves ample
room for a contrary conclusion under Title VII; at a minimum, it does not
compel either result.
Notwithstanding that the Supreme Court has not provided direct instruction
on this issue, the most plausible result is that Title VII does not permit a fees-
only suit. The plain language of the statute suggests this result,222 and the
Carey decision does not preclude it, leaving open the question of the propriety
of suits that seek only fees from the outset. 23 The Court's subsequent holding
in Crest Street, interpreting a similar statute, makes this conclusion more
likely. The issue is ripe for decision by the Court in the Title VII context, and
the Court is likely to address it when the right case arises, squarely presenting
the issue.
224
B. Applicable Preclusion Rules
After untangling the statutory-authority portion of the additional-remedy-
cases thread, solely the preclusion question remains. The cases comprising this
thread involve claims for relief beyond the amount recovered in related state
proceedings-excluding the fees-only suits discussed in the preceding
225
section-that arise after entry of a final judgment by a state court. While the
statutory provisions discussed above govem fees-only suits, preclusion rules
will control in the remaining cases. Thus, the focus of the inquiry is on the
preclusive effect of a state-court judgment entered on appeal from an
administrative determination.
The Second Circuit's decision in Nestor is the seminal case presenting these
issues. As discussed above, the plaintiff prevailed on her state-law sex-
discrimination claims at the administrative level and in the appeal brought by
the defendant. 226 The plaintiff subsequently brought a federal lawsuit under
Title VII, seeking compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees,
and pre-judgment interest-remedies that were not available to her under state
law. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that claim preclusion barred relitigation of the
222. See supra Part IV.A.2.b (interpreting plain language of Title VII's fee-shifting provision
to preclude independent fees-only suit). See generally Davidson, supra note 27, at 450-51
(concluding that the Supreme Court intended its holding in Crest Street to apply in Title VII
cases).
223. N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 477 U.S. 54, 58 (1980).
224. The Court declined to address this issue by denying the plaintiff's petition for a writ of
certiorari in Chris v. Tenet. 531 U.S. 1191 (2001). No such opportunity arose in conjunction
with the more recent Second Circuit case, Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, in which the defendant
employer did not seek certiorari. 466 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2006).
225. As discussed above, Title VII does not authorize a suit solely seeking attorney's fees
incurred in state proceedings. See supra Part IV.A.2.b.
226. Nestor, 466 F.3d at 68.
227. Id. at 68-69.
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discrimination claims resolved in the state proceedings. 228 The Second Circuit,
noting that the issue presented a split among the circuits,22 9 rejected the district
court's conclusion.2 3  The court determined that the plaintiff's Title VII claims
survived regardless of whether federal or state preclusion law controlled.23 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took a similar
approach in Patzer v. Board of Regents.232 In Patzer, the plaintiff prevailed on
his sex- and race-discrimination claims in the state administrative proceedings,
and the state courts affirmed those findings.233 He subsequently filed a federal
lawsuit under Title VII, seeking back pay that had not been available under
state law. 234 The district court granted summary judgment on the grounds that
235the claim was barred, but the Seventh Circuit reversed. Although the court
concluded that the Title VII suit asserted the same claim as the state action and
that the state judgment should therefore bar the plaintiff from proceeding, 236 it
went on to find that Wisconsin law, which applied in accordance with the
Supreme Court's decision in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., would
recognize a policy-based "exception to the general rule of res judicata on the
peculiar facts of this case. ' 237 The court found that barring the plaintiffs
claims would frustrate Title VII's "policy of referral and deferral" through
which Title VII proceedings are "supplementary to available state remedies for
employment discrimination." 238  Thus, the application of claim preclusion
would prevent a plaintiff from obtaining complete relief by rendering the back-
pay remedy wholly unavailable, contrary to Title VII's professed policy.23
9
The court therefore permitted plaintiff's duplicative litigation to proceed.
240
Both of these cases properly note the pertinence of the Supreme Court's
decision in Kremer, but neither applies it correctly. 24 1 The Supreme Court's
decision in Kremer unequivocally commands that federal courts give full faith
242and credit to state-court judgments in Title VII cases. The application of
state preclusion law will cause the result to vary from state to state, but the
same prevailing policy concerns should apply nationwide. Thus, where the
228. Id. at 69.
229. Id. (citation omitted).
230. Id at 69-70.
231. Id.
232. 763 F.2d 851, 853-54 (7th Cir. 1985).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 854.
235. ld. at 858.
236. Id. at 856.
237. Id. at 855-56.
238. Id. at 856-58.
239. Id. at 856, 858.
240. Id. at 858.
241. Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2006); Patzer, 763 F.2d at 854-55.
242. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 & n.6 (1982).
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governing state's preclusion rules provide leeway, the court should take
account of Title VII's policy against inefficiency and duplicative litigation, as
reflected in the legislative history. 243 These policy concerns, coupled with
traditional notions of fairness, militate heavily against permitting a plaintiff to
manipulate Title VII's deferral scheme by seeking a liability determination in
the potentially friendlier state forum, rather than pursuing additional remedies
in federal court.
1. Kremer's Full-Faith-and-Credit Command
The Supreme Court's decision in Kremer unequivocally held that the federal
full faith and credit statute applies in Title VII cases.244 The Court carefully
considered whether Title VII repealed § 1738 and determined that it did not.245
To that end, the Court found no conflict between Title VII and § 1738,
concluding instead that the statutes were by no means incompatible.
246
According to the Court, this interpretation avoided an anomalous result: absent
§ 1738's full-faith-and-credit directive, the finality of state-court decisions
"would depend on which side prevailed in a given case." 247 Thus, a judgment
favorable to the plaintiff would remain final, while a judgment for the
defendant would lead to an inevitable subsequent suit in federal court. These
concerns led the Court to conclude that Title VII did not result in an implied
repeal of § 1738 and that the statutes should operate together. 48
The Court bolstered its conclusion by reference to pertinent legislative
history.249  Specifically, the Court found ample evidence in the legislative
debates--concerning both the original enactment and the 1972 amendments-
indicating that Congress intended to leave the full faith and credit statute intact
in Title VII cases.25° The most significant evidence included comments
suggesting that Congress did not intend for a single claim to be fully litigated
in multiple forums. Perhaps the best indication of Congress's vision arose in
conjunction with the 1972 amendments, described by the Court as follows:
An important indication that Congress did not intend Title VII to
repeal § 1738's requirement that federal courts give full faith and
credit to state court judgments is found in an exchange between
243. See infra Part IV.B.2.c.
244. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466 & n.6.
245. Id. at 468-76.
246. Id. at 470, 471 n.8, 476.
247. Id. at 470.
248. Id. at 475-76.
249. Id. at 470 ("Since an implied repeal must ordinarily be evident from the language or
operation of a statute, the lack of such manifest incompatibility between Title VII and § 1738 is
enough to answer our inquiry."). The Court was quick to point out, however, that resort to the
legislative history was unnecessary given the compatibility between Title VII and § 1738. Id.
250. Id. at 468-76.
251. Id.at473-74.
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Senator [Jacob] Javits, a manager of the 1972 bill, and Senator
[Roman] Hruska. Senator Hruska, concerned with the potential for
multiple independent proceedings on a single discrimination charge,
had introduced an amendment which would have eliminated many of
the duplicative remedies for employment discrimination. Senator
Javits argued that the amendment was unnecessary because the
doctrine of res judicata would prevent repetitive litigation against a
single defendant:
"[T]here is the real capability in this situation of dealing
with the question on the basis of res judicata. In other
words once there is a litigation-a litigation started by the
Commission, a litigation started by the Attorney General,
or a litigation started by the individual-the remedy has
been chosen and can be followed through and no
relitigation of the same issues in a different forum would
be permitted.,
252
The Court also quoted Senator Harrison Williams, "another proponent of the
1972 bill," as stating that he "'d[id] not believe that the individual claimant
should be allowed to litigate his claim to completion in one forum, and then if
dissatisfied, go to another forum to try again. '253 The plain import of this
legislative history, therefore, reinforces the conclusion that the Court reached
by reference to the statutes: that Title VII did not supplant § 1738. As such,
the command of Kremer is clear and indubitable: the federal courts must give
full faith and credit to state-court judgments in Title VII cases.
While Kremer did not expressly overrule the Court's earlier decision in
Carey, its holding clarified Carey's limited scope. The Carey Court held that a
plaintiff who prevailed in state administrative proceedings could recover
attorney's fees from such proceedings in a subsequent suit in federal court.
254
A broad reading of that decision would permit a Title VII fees-only suit in any
such case and could even be construed to condone pursuit of any additional
remedies that were not available in prior state proceedings. Kremer, however,
made clear that Carey does not sweep so broadly. As discussed above, Kremer
instructs the federal courts to accord full faith and credit to state-court
judgments in Title VII suits. 255 A court cannot obey this directive while
simultaneously applying a broad reading of Carey, because according full faith
and credit to the state judgment often means giving it claim-preclusive effect.
Where the state judgment receives claim-preclusive effect, it should bar
252. Id. at 475 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 3370 (1972) (statement of Sen. Javits)).
253. Id. at 476 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 3372 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams)).
254. N.Y. Gas Light Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 61 (1980); see also supra notes 149-
64 and accompanying text (discussing the Carey decision).
255. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 475-76.
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relitigation of the same claim whether the available remedies differ or not.256
The plaintiffs discrimination claims were merged into his prior suit; thus, the
judgment rendered in that suit bars him from pursuing the same claims
repetitively.
A narrower reading of Carey better comports with the Court's subsequent
decision in Kremer. The Carey Court held that a plaintiff who prevails in state
administrative proceedings can pursue recovery of the attomey's fees he
incurred in those proceedings in a subsequent federal-court suit. 2 7 The case
presented no preclusion issues and therefore says nothing about how they
should be resolved. Kremer subsequently addressed preclusion in the Title VII
context and remains the controlling precedent on that issue.
The Second Circuit in Nestor misapplied Kremer by giving the Court's
decision in Carey too much weight. The Nestor court expressly rejected the
defendant's argument that Kremer eroded Carey, reconciling the cases by
limiting Kremer's reach: "we can read the two cases together as holding that a
state court's decision on the merits of a discrimination claim is entitled to full
faith and credit, but that Title VII permits a claimant to seek-in federal
court-'supplemental' relief that was unavailable in the state court.' 258 The
court's rationale undermines both Kremer's clear command and critical policy
concerns.
The Court in Kremer placed no qualifications or limits on its determination
that state-court judgments deserve full faith and credit in federal Title VII
suits.259 The Nestor court would limit that holding, rendering it inapplicable
when the plaintiff is seeking additional remedies.260 Indeed, its decision could
even be construed to suggest that state-court judgments deserve issue-
preclusive effect in Title VII cases such that the state's "decision on the merits
of a discrimination claim is entitled to full faith and credit," but that claim
preclusion does not apply. 261 From this vantage point, the court would give
full faith and credit to the state's liability determination but would allow the
plaintiff to proceed on identical claims for separate relief. The plaintiff could
have his cake and eat it too, relying on Kremer's full faith and credit to his
benefit, without suffering its burden. The Court's decision in Kremer,
however, neither suggests nor permits such an approach. The full faith and
256. The preclusive effect of the state judgment is, of course, determined by the law of the
state that rendered it. See Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 373-74
(1985); Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-82. The effect of typical state preclusion law, and the policy
concerns that should influence it, are discussed infra in Part IV.B.2.
257. Carey, 447 U.S. at 71.
258. Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2006).
259. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468-70.
260. Nestor, 466 F.3d at 72.
261. Id.
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credit statute includes no additional-relief exception, and Kremer leaves no
room to apply one.
2 62
The policy concerns that prevailed in Kremer suggest that the Nestor court's
reading is implausible. The Kremer Court emphasized that Title VII's drafters
263did not envision an inefficient system that fosters duplicative litigation. To
the contrary, the court noted that "[n]othing in the legislative history of the
1964 Act suggests that Congress considered it necessary or desirable to
provide an absolute right to relitigate in federal court an issue resolved by a
state court." 264 In addition to the Senate commentary excerpted above, 265 the
Court also highlighted the remarks of Senator Everett Dirksen, a principal
drafter of the original 1964 Senate bill:
Senator Dirksen . . . stated in no uncertain terms his desire to
avoid multiple suits arising out of the same discrimination:
'What a layering upon layer of enforcement. What if
the court orders differed in their terms or requirements?
There would be no assurance that they would be identical.
Should we have the Federal forces of justice pull on the
one arm, and the State forces of justice tug on the other?
Should we draw and quarter the victim?"'
26
The import of these excerpts is clear: Title VII's referral and deferral scheme
should not breed multiple suits, and uncompromising loyalty to § 1738's full-
faith-and-credit command also produces this result.
The Kremer Court found that strict adherence to § 1738 not only promotes
the efficiency concerns expressed by Title VII's drafters, but also supports the
"comity and federalism interests embodied in § 1738.,267 Responding to the
plaintiff s concern that according full faith and credit to state-court judgments
will "deter claimants from seeking state court review of their claims ultimately
leading to a deterioration in the quality of the state administrative process," the
Court found countervailing considerations more persuasive:
[S]tripping state court judgments of finality would be far more
destructive to the quality of adjudication by lessening the incentive
for full participation by the parties and for searching review by state
officials. Depriving state judgments of finality not only would
violate basic tenets of comity and federalism, but also would reduce
262. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 473-76 (1982).
263. See id. at 473-78 (discussing Title Vli's legislative history and noting that it is unlikely
that Congress considered it necessary to provide a relitigation right in federal court).
264. Id. at 473.
265. See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text (discussing portions of legislative
history relied on by the Court in Kremer).
266. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 474 n.14 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6449 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Dirksen)).
267. Id. at 478.
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the incentive for States to work towards effective and meaningful
antidiscrimination systems.
268
The Court's decision in Kremer therefore left little to no room for variation.
According to the Kremer Court's analysis, the language of both Title VII and §
1738 suggests that federal courts should accord state judgments full faith and
credit and that prevailing policy concerns of efficiency, federalism, and comity
compel that result.
269
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions clearly show that Kremer's directive
applies without limitation. In Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, the Court not only cited Kremer approvingly, but also relied upon its
analytical framework, noting that "Kremer indicates that § 1738 requires a
federal court to look first to state preclusion law in determining the preclusive
effects of a state court judgment." 270 The Marrese Court went on to apply that
principle to the facts at hand, concluding that state preclusion law should
govern the effect of a state judgment rendered on a claim within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts.271 The Court's decision in Marrese embodies
the enduring and pervasive impact of Kremer's resolve.
272
Like the Second Circuit in Nestor, the Seventh Circuit in Patzer also gave
insufficient weight to Kremer's edict. The Patzer court accurately described
Kremer's holding in broad terms, citing Kremer for the proposition that "[i]n
general, a judgment affirming an administrative decision is res judicata as to
the claims adjudicated, no less than a judgment entered after a trial on the
,,273
merits. However, the court went on to discredit Kremer's import on the
facts of the case, suggesting that it "would frustrate the supplementary purpose
of Title VII as surely as treating the administrative decision itself as a bar."27
4
Kremer's full-faith-and-credit directive is not optional, and it leaves no room
for such loose, policy-based erosions. In casting aside the Kremer rule, the
Patzer court disregarded controlling precedent without sufficient reason.
The Patzer court attempted to further justify its divergence from the
Supreme Court's precedent on the grounds that adherence to the Kremer full-
faith-and-credit rule would create an "anomaly: a complainant who prevailed
[in administrative proceedings] without suffering an appeal to state court
would be entitled to seek supplementary Title VII remedies in state court, but
one who prevailed [administratively] and prevailed again on appeal in state
268. Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
269. Id.
270. Morrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 381 (1985).
271. Id. at384-86.
272. Id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996) ("Federal
courts may not 'employ their own rules ... in determining the effect of state judgments,' but must
Iaccept the rules chosen by the State from which the judgment is taken."' (alteration in original)
(quoting Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-82)).
273. Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 858 (7th Cir. 1985).
274. Id.
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court could not.",275 This is, indeed, a possibility under Kremer, yet no matter
how anomalous this scenario may be, it results directly from the unbending
rule that the Kremer Court established, which is still in effect today. The
Patzer court's disregard of it lacks foundation, because Kremer directs federal
district courts to accord full faith and credit to state-court judgments in Title
VII cases.276 In that respect, Kremer's rule is absolute.
2. The Import of Typical State Preclusion Rules
The Kremer Court's unequivocal full-faith-and-credit command leaves room
for variation only under the law of the state that rendered the original
judgment. Because each state follows its own preclusion rules, making
sweeping generalizations about the outcome of every Title VII case is virtually
impossible. However, many states have adopted the rules reflected in the
Second Restatement of Judgments or close approximations thereof, which
277provides some degree of uniformity in such cases. Thus, discussion of the
governing principles in a jurisdiction that applies the Restatement is
appropriate. Application of the Restatement preclusion rules should bar a
plaintiff from splitting his claim between the state and federal forums in most
cases, especially in light of pertinent policy concerns.
a. The Core Concepts of Merger and Bar
The crucial starting point in these cases is the Restatement's rule against
splitting claims that arise from the same transaction. Section 24(1) of the
Second Restatement of Judgments directs:
When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action
extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or
bar . . . , the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to
remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the
action arose.278
Paragraph two of the same section offers further insight about the requisite
relatedness:
275. Id.
276. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481-82.
277. See, e.g., Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Connecticut law
applies the 'transactional test' described in Section 24 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
..... ); Fayer v  Town of Middlebury, 258 F.3d 117, 124 (2nd Cir. 2001) (noting the explanation
given by the Second Restatement of Judgments and commenting that "[a] judgment ... does not
preclude claims that could not have been made in the forum from which the judgment issues");
Simmons v. New Pub. Sch. Dist. No. Eight, 251 F.3d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Second
Restatement of Judgments); Staats v. County of Sawyer, 220 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2000)
(analyzing whether jurisdiction is proper by resort to the Second Restatement of Judgments).
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1980).
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What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction", and what
groupings constitute a "series", are to be determined pragmatically,
giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related
in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient
trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the
parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.
279
It is hardly debatable that a plaintiff who has filed suit for discrimination and
who also has an additional-remedy claim satisfies this definition. In the typical
additional-remedy case, a plaintiff seeks a compensatory or punitive damage
award for which the applicable state law in the prior proceedings did not
provide. For example, in Nestor, the plaintiff sought attorney's fees,
compensatory damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages after
recovering only back pay and interest in the state proceedings. 280 The plaintiff
in Patzer sought back pay and attorney's fees in federal court to supplement
the injunctive relief he obtained at the state level. 281 In both cases, it is clear
that the plaintiffs' federal suits arose from the same transactions as the claims
282pursued in the state proceedings. Each plaintiff simply sought to recover
additional relief on the exact same claim of discrimination previously
adjudicated. 283  This is likely true in most additional-remedies cases
comprising this thread of the web.
b. The Jurisdictional-Limit Exception
Both the Nestor and Patzer courts avoided the import of the merger rule by
applying an exception found in § 26(l)(c) of the Second Restatement of
Judgments, which preserves claims otherwise barred under the general rule
when
[t]he plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or
to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because
of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or
restrictions on their authority to entertain multiple theories or
demands for multiple remedies or forms of relief in a single action,
and the plaintiff desires in the second action to rely on that theory or
to seek that remedy or form of relief.
28 4
279. Id. § 24.
280. Nestor, 466 F.3d at 67.
281. Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 853 (7th Cir. 1985).
282. Nestor, 466 F.3d at 72; Patzer, 763 F.2d at 855.
283. Nestor, 466 F.3d at 72; Patzer, 763 F.2d at 855.
284. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1980).
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The Nestor court, applying Connecticut law, and the Patzer court, adhering to
the law of Wisconsin, both found this exception controlling and permitted the
plaintiffs to proceed in their additional-remedy suits.
285
The error of these courts lies in their failure to take sufficient account of the
circumstances giving rise to the plaintiffs suit and the plaintiffs control over
them. The Restatement does provide an exception to the rule against claim
splitting when the court that rendered the original judgment lacked jurisdiction
to entertain or award certain remedies. The exception should not apply,
286however, when the plaintiff's free choice led him to that forum. Although
the Restatement does not speak explicitly on this point, it implies it by
reserving the jurisdictional-limit exception for those cases in which the
plaintiff never had the opportunity to assert the related claims:
The general rule [against claim splitting found in] ... § 24 is largely
predicated on the assumption that the jurisdiction in which the first
judgment was rendered was one which put no formal barriers in the
way of a litigant's presenting to a court in one action the entire claim
including any theories of recovery or demands for relief that might
have been available to him under applicable law. When such formal
barriers in fact existed and were operative against a plaintiff in the
first action, it is unfair to preclude him from a second action in which
he can present those phases of the claim which he was disabled from
presenting in the first.
The formal barriers referred to may stem from limitations on the
competency of the system of courts in which the first action was
instituted, or from the persistence in the system of courts of older
285. Nestor, 466 F.3d at 73-74; Patzer, 763 F.2d at 857 ("In general, res judicata does not
operate to bar matters that were not raised before the administrative agency and over which it did
not have jurisdiction.").
286. See, e.g., Strickland v. City of Albuquerque, 130 F.3d 1408, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1997)
(refusing to apply an exception to res judicata to plaintiff's federal constitutional claims because
they could have been asserted in the state-court proceedings reviewing a related administrative
determination); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 864-65 (7th Cir. 1996) ("If a
plaintiff has a collection of claims that arise from one set of events and has an unconstrained
choice between a forum of limited jurisdiction and a forum of broad jurisdiction, a decision to
proceed in the more limited forum precludes her from bringing the unlitigated claims in a
subsequent proceeding."); Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1563 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (suggesting that the exception in section 26(l)(c) of the Second Restatement of
Judgments does not apply when plaintiff chose a forum of limited jurisdiction); Burgos v.
Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Thus, where a plaintiff was precluded from
recovering damages in the initial action by formal jurisdictional or statutory barriers, not by
plaintiffs choice, a subsequent action for damages will not normally be barred by res judicata
even where it arises from the same factual circumstances as the initial action."); Supporters to
Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1326-27 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that
the exception in section 26(l)(c) of the Second Restatement of Judgments "does not extend to
cases in which claim-splitting flows from the plaintiffs choice [because] [r]es judicata is a
doctrine of defendant's protection, not of plaintiffs right").
2010]
Catholic University Law Review
modes of procedure-the forms of action or the separation of law
from equity or vestigial procedural doctrines associated with
either. 2
89
By implication, where the plaintiff did have the option to take his case to a
different forum, his failure to do so should bar him from splitting his claims.
Section 25 of the Restatement bolsters this result:
As the result of a single transaction or a connected series of
transactions giving rise to a unitary claim, the plaintiff may be
entitled to a number of alternative or cumulative remedies or forms
of relief against the defendant. In a modem system of procedure it is
ordinarily open to the plaintiff to pursue in one action all the possible
remedies whether or not consistent, whether alternative or
cumulative, and whether of the types historically called legal or
equitable.
Therefore it is fair to hold that after judgment for or against the
plaintiff, the claim is ordinarily exhausted so that the plaintiff is
precluded from seeking any other remedies deriving from the same
grouping of facts.
288
The referral and deferral scheme of Title VII requires only that the EEOC
refrain from acting on a charge for sixty days in order to give any applicable
state agency time to consider and act on the complainant's claims.289 After the
expiration of that sixty-day period, the complainant is free to pursue his claim
in the federal system and drop his state charge at any time. Further, a plaintiff
who continues to pursue his claims in the state administrative system is not
necessarily precluded from seeking any relief available under Title VII once
the claims reach the state courts. While the state administrative agencies might
lack jurisdiction to decide any claims under Title VII, it is clear that the state
courts would not. 29 The Supreme Court has declared unequivocally that Title
VII claims do not lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. 29'
Thus, most cases will present a plaintiff with the option either to drop his state
claim entirely and pursue remedies in the federal system or to add Title VII
claims once the case reaches the state courts. The Restatement's jurisdictional-
limit exception should not apply whenever these choices are available but are
bypassed.
287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 cmt. c (1980).
288. Id. § 25 cmt. f.
289. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(3)(i)-(ii) (2008).
290. Whether the state agencies might have jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims is a question
of state law that is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article proceeds on the assumption that
they do not. If they did possess such jurisdiction, however, it seems clear that the jurisdictional-
limit exception in section 26(1)(c) of the Second Restatement of Judgments would not apply, and
preclusion would bar plaintiff's subsequent Title VII suit.
291. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821 (1990).
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Although no court has properly applied these rules in a Title VII additional-
remedies case of the sort relevant here, several courts have applied them
properly in other contexts. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit in Strickland v. City of Albuquerque affords an excellent
example.2 92 The plaintiff in Strickland pursued employment-discrimination
claims in the state administrative system.293 Dissatisfied with the agency's
finding that his employer had cause to terminate his employment and in
accordance with applicable New Mexico law, the plaintiff appealed the agency
determination in the New Mexico state courts.294 Both the state district court
and the state court of appeals affirmed the agency's findings, resulting in entry
of a final judgment against the plaintiff.295 When the plaintiff then pursued a
civil-rights claim arising out of the same events in federal court under § 1983
of title 42 of the United States Code, the defendant sought summary judgment
296on the ground that the claim was barred by res judicata. The district court
granted the defendant's motion, and the plaintiff appealed.29 7  The Tenth
Circuit affirmed, rejecting the plaintiffs contention that the jurisdictional
limitations of the original state administrative forum exempt related federal
claims from the usual claim-preclusion bar.298 Even though the plaintiff might
not have been able to assert his § 1983 claim in the state administrative
proceedings, he could have joined that claim to the suit brought in state
299
court. Claim preclusion bars the plaintiff from later pursuing the § 1983
claim that could have been joined to the suit in state court.
The Strickland court does not directly address the choice that plaintiffs
pursuing discrimination claims covered by Title VII face: to opt out of the state
administrative forum after expiration of the sixty-day deferral period in favor
of a forum (state or federal) that can hear his Title VII claims. Nevertheless,
Strickland's holding is instructive. The core principle underlying Strickland,
and other cases like it, is that when the plaintiff fails to pursue related claims
by virtue of his own choice-whether that is a choice of forum, a choice of
pleading, or otherwise-he cannot pursue the selectively omitted claims in a
subsequent proceeding. 300 This is the essence of the preclusion doctrine.
The Strickland decision also raises another important point about the choices
a plaintiff faces in the additional-remedy cases with which this Article is
concerned: even if the plaintiff does not opt out of the state administrative
292. 130 F.3d 1408 (10th Cir. 1997).




297. Id. at 1410-11.
298. Id. at 1411-13.
299. Id. at 1412.
300. Id. at 1413 (citing Ford v. N.M. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 891 P.2d 546, 555 (N.M. Ct. App.
1994)).
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forum, he still may choose to assert his Title VII claim if and when the claim
reaches the state courts. In such circumstances, state courts would have
jurisdiction over Title VII claims in proceedings reviewing agency findings
just as the state court in Strickland would have had jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's § 1983 claim. 30'
The additional-remedy plaintiffs in both Nestor and Patzer faced these
choices and opted to forego federal remedies. The Nestor court was explicit in
this regard: "Nestor had a choice: she could pursue the [state administrative]
proceeding, or after passage of a 'deferral' period, she could have requested a
'right-to-sue' letter and brought an action in state or federal court to recover
full relief., 30 2  In contrast, the Patzer court held that additional-remedy
plaintiffs could bring Title VII actions for supplementary remedies in state or
federal court.30 3 The plaintiff did not, however, begin to pursue his federal
remedies until approximately ten years after filing his initial charge, at which
time he finally requested and received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.3 °4
During the passage of that ten-year period, the state agency adjudicated the
plaintiffs initial claim, two state courts affirmed those findings on appeal, and
the plaintiff filed a separate suit in state court.30 5 At no point during that
process did he ever attempt to pursue federal remedies. He could have done so
much sooner, but he elected instead to allow his federal claims to lie dormant.
The courts in Nestor and Patzer erred in failing to take account of these
choices, and the errors have substantial policy implications.
c. Law and Policy against the Jurisdictional-Limit Exception
To apply the jurisdictional-limit exception blindly would disservice Title
VII, Supreme Court precedents, and fairness and efficiency. First, as discussed
above, Kremer stated that § 1738 controls in Title VII suits, and nothing about
the Court's opinion suggests that that command should vary depending on
whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies. 30 6  However, that is
exactly what would happen if the jurisdictional-limit exception prevailed. A
plaintiff would be free to pursue his transactionally related claims without
regard to the claim-preclusion doctrine, but he could freely rely on issue
preclusion to establish the defendant's liability. The Kremer Court, however,
was explicit about its abhorrence for such inefficiency:
Nothing in the legislative history of the 1964 Act suggests that
Congress considered it necessary or desirable to provide an absolute
right to relitigate in federal court an issue resolved by a state court.
301. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821-26 (1990) (holding that state
courts may adjudicate Title VII cases).
302. Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2006).
303. Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 853-54 (1985).
304. Id. at 853-54.
305. Id.
306. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,468 (1982).
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While striving to craft an optimal niche for the States in the overall
enforcement scheme, the legislators did not envision full litigation of
a single claim in both state and federal forums.30 7
The Court bolstered this conclusion with multiple citations to Title VII's
legislative history, making plain that Congress never envisioned the kind of
308
claim splitting that the Nestor approach condoned.
Fairness concerns also necessitate adhering to preclusion rules when
perceived jurisdictional defects that might suggest application of the
jurisdictional-limit exception result from the plaintiffs choice of forum. State
administrative proceedings offer certain advantages to plaintiffs. The
Connecticut law applied in Nestor provides an example. The Nestor court
acknowledged that the plaintiff benefited from both representation by staff
counsel at a substantial cost savings over a private attorney and from "flexible
evidentiary rules, no requirement of discovery, and speed[ier] proceedings." 309
Common systemic distinctions like these render it extraordinarily unfair to
permit a plaintiff who opts to pursue his claims in a friendlier forum to
subsequently subject the defendant to additional, duplicative litigation in order
to pursue supplemental remedies that were not available in the first chosen
forum. The fairness problem is exacerbated when the court in the subsequent
suit accords the original judgment full faith and credit selectively-allowing
the plaintiffs duplicative claim to proceed without reference to claim
preclusion yet permitting him to rely upon issue preclusion to establish the
defendant's liability. Although this fairness problem plagued the Nestor
court's decision, the court's faulty rationale should not endure.
3 10
Precluding a plaintiff from duplicating his claims when he has a choice of
forum is not inconsistent with federalism principles, despite the suggestions of
this view's opponents. It is true that barring his Title VII claims in these
circumstances may incentivize him to abandon the state administrative forum
at the earliest opportunity; however, that does not mean he must jettison the
state system altogether. A plaintiff can still invoke the protections his state
affords by filing a lawsuit in state court while leaving intact the federal-state
balance underlying Title VII.
307. Id. at 473-74.
308. Id. at 475 ("'[O]nce there is a litigation ... the remedy has been chosen and can be
followed through and no relitigation of the same issues in a different forum would be permitted."'
(quoting 118 CONG. REC. 3370 (1972) (statement of Sen. Javits))); id. at 476 ("'[I] do not believe
that the individual claimant should be allowed to litigate his claim to completion in one forum,
and then if dissatisfied, go to another forum to try again."' (alteration in original) (quoting 118
CONG. REC. 3372 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams))).
309. Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2006).
310. Id. at 72-73; see also supra notes 258-69 and accompanying text (discussing the Nestor
court's erroneous reconciliation of Kremer and Carey so as to permit a plaintiff to seek
supplemental Title VII remedies while relying on the prior administrative liability determination).
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Once a plaintiff bypasses the opportunity to pursue Title VII remedies in
state or federal court, choosing instead the advantages of the friendlier state
administrative forum, preclusion rules should bar him from proceeding under
Title VII in a subsequent suit. Kremer dictates this result by requiring that
311federal courts accord state judgments full faith and credit in Title VII cases.
As the Kremer Court recognized, the original drafters of Title VII did not
intend that its referral and deferral scheme would perpetuate a multiplicity of
litigation.312  To the contrary, the legislative history shows that Congress
intended to afford Title VII plaintiffs the right to pursue their grievances under
any applicable state law, while offering them the option to pursue a federal
claim instead when they perceive the state system as inadequate. 313 Fairness
concerns amply support the policy argument against inefficiency and
multiplicity that Title VII reflects. The law affords plaintiffs a choice to
pursue relief under state law, under federal law, or under both, but it does not
allow them to manipulate the system by seeking separate remedies in
sequence. A plaintiff cannot have his cake and eat it too.
C. The Heart of the Matter: The Disentanglement's Revelation About the
Circuit Split
Unraveling the final threads of the web leads to an important revelation
about the apparent split among the circuits. As mentioned above, the Nestor
decision attracted some attention among legal commentators because of the
314
circuit split that it referenced. Notably, however, the Second Circuit's
approach differed somewhat markedly from that of the other courts comprising
the split. 31 5 The majority of courts confronting additional-remedy cases in
recent years have employed a statutory analysis to ascertain the viability of the
suit.3 16  The Fourth Circuit led this charge with its decision in Chris,
317
accompanied by the Eighth Circuit through its Jones decision. The Nestor
court briefly considered the defendant's statutory-jurisdiction argument but
focused most of its attention on the preclusion doctrine, ultimately deciding
that the plaintiffs Title VII additional-remedy claims were not barred.3 18 Of
311. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466.
312. Id. at 475-76.
313. Id. (discussing the legislative history of Title VII and the disfavor of duplicative
litigation that it reflects); see also supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
314. See Castagnera et al., supra note 27, at 3; Current Circuit Splits, supra note 27, at 517;
Employment Discrimination-Procedure, supra note 27, at 1200-01.
315. Compare Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 70, 71-74 (2d Cir. 2006) (focusing on
the preclusion doctrine), with Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 651-53 (4th Cir. 2000) (employing
statutory analysis), and Jones v. Am. State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 494-98 (8th Cir. 1988) (same).
316. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (discussing recent additional-remedy
cases decided under Title VII).
317. Chris, 221 F.3d at 651-52; Jones, 857 F.2d at 497-98.
318. Nestor, 466 F.3d at 71-74.
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the cases comprising the core of the split, only one other relied on the
preclusion doctrine-the Seventh Circuit's decision in Patzer.
319
The most plausible explanation for the difference in approaches taken by the
Patzer and Nestor courts, on the one hand, and the Jones and Chris courts, on
the other, is not that the courts disagree about how to resolve additional-
remedy cases. Some disagreement lurks in the decisions, but at their core, the
courts take contrasting approaches because of differences in procedural
posture. The federal lawsuits in both Patzer and Nestor followed final state-
court judgments entered on appeal from state administrative proceedings. 320 It
is therefore natural that the courts in those cases would focus on preclusion
principles, because the presence of a valid final judgment disposing of the
same claims is not only a core component of the preclusion doctrine, but
indeed cries out for the court's consideration. By contrast, neither Jones nor
Chris involved a state-court judgment. The plaintiff in Jones filed her federal
lawsuit after prevailing in a state administrative hearing from which the
defendant employer never sought appeal. 321 The plaintiff in Chris sought
attorney's fees in federal court after settling her discrimination claims during
322
administrative proceedings. It is therefore not surprising that neither court
addressed preclusion principles, because neither case involved a state-court
judgment, rendering preclusion wholly inapplicable from the start.
Given the distinct procedural postures, the commentators who have cited
these cases as part of a circuit split may have at least partially misrepresented
the situation. 32 The different procedural context in which each case arose may
explain the contrasting outcomes, suggesting that there may not be a split of
authority at all, or at least that it is narrower than once thought: the Jones and
Chris cases raised no preclusion issues because they involved no prior
judgment;324 the Nestor and Patzer cases turned on preclusion principlesbecause they did.325
V. CONCLUSION
Title VII's referral and deferral scheme embodies important federalism goals
but also creates knotty preclusion and jurisdiction issues. The law requires a
plaintiff to give any pertinent state or local administrative agency the first
opportunity to resolve his claims. 326 Sometimes a grievance goes no further,
319. Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 854-56 (7th Cir. 1985).
320. Nestor, 466 F.3d at 67; Patzer, 763 F.2d at 853-54.
321. Jones, 857 F.2d at 495-96.
322. Chris, 221 F.3d at 649-50.
323. See sources cited supra note 314.
324. Chris, 221 F.3d at 650; Jones, 857 F.2d at 495.
325. Nestor, 466 F.3d at 68-69; Patzer, 763 F.2d at 853.
326. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2006); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821
(1990) (explaining that federal courts do not have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over Title
VII lawsuits).
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but often the state administrative proceeding is only the beginning of the
adjudicative process, and the dual state-federal enforcement scheme that Title
VII creates may mean that a state agency, a state court, the federal EEOC, or
some combination thereof may all have touched the plaintiffs claim by the
time it reaches a federal court. The federal court must then grapple with such
questions as whether any prior state determination or judgment precludes the
plaintiffs federal claims in part or in their entirety, and whether Title VII
authorizes the claims that the plaintiff asserts.
The Supreme Court's decisions on these issues offer limited instruction.
Elliott makes clear that unreviewed state-agency determinations deserve no
preclusive effect; therefore, a plaintiff who proceeds directly from the state
agency to federal court typically may pursue his Title VII claims without
limitation.327 By contrast, the federal courts must accord state judgments full
faith and credit under Kremer.328 While the scope of the Court's decision in
Kremer is not entirely clear, the better interpretation suggests that the holding
sweeps broadly so that its full-faith-and-credit command applies regardless of
which party prevailed initially and regardless of the degree of deference
afforded to administrative determinations under the applicable state law.
329
Beyond the confines of Elliott and Kremer, the Court has left the state of the
law in this arena in substantial doubt, particularly as to those cases in which the
plaintiff files a Title VII suit in federal court after prevailing in state
proceedings, seeking additional remedies that were not available under state
law. The federal courts disagree on the proper approach in these cases: some
frame the issue as one of statutory authority, others treat it as a matter of
preclusion, and still others craft a hybrid approach. Courts and commentators
proffer that the cases give rise to a circuit split, with some permitting such
additional-remedy cases to proceed while others do not. At its core, however,
the differential outcomes may not give rise to a circuit split at all; rather, they
may be explained as nothing more than differing approaches in response to
distinct procedural postures.
This Article untangles the knotty web these cases create by revealing that the
posture of the case should dictate the governing rule and proposing the
outcome in each that best comports with Title VII policy and traditional
notions of fairness. Cases in which the plaintiff seeks solely attorney's fees
incurred in state proceedings comprise one category. These types of cases
should be dismissed, but not due to a jurisdictional defect as some courts
suggest. Even if Title VII's jurisdictional grant does not support bringing such
cases to federal court, the fact that they arise solely under federal law should be
sufficient to permit the district court to proceed. The statutory defect in these
327. Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 789 (1986); see also supra Part 11 (discussing
the import and breadth of the Elliott decision).
328. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982).
329. See supra Part III (discussing the scope of the Kremer decision).
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cases lies instead in Title VII's fee-shifting provision. Title VII likely does not
support an independent fees-only suit, and courts should dismiss such cases on
those grounds.
Other additional-remedy cases, such as those seeking more than just fees,
should not face statutory challenges but are no less vulnerable, because
preclusion rules will-or at the very least should---often bar them. The
Supreme Court's edict in Kremer that federal courts must accord full faith and
credit to state judgments in Title VII suits means that the outcome in each case
will turn on state preclusion law. Therefore, variants in the governing rules are
inevitable. By way of a far-reaching example, the law of those states that
follow the Second Restatement of Judgments should compel the court to bar
plaintiffs from pursuing duplicative litigation in most cases. The original
drafters of Title VII did not intend for its referral and deferral scheme to breed
inefficient multiplicity of claims.330 Moreover, traditional notions of fairness
mandate that courts halt any attempts to manipulate the system by obtaining a
favorable liability judgment under relaxed rules and subsequently importing
that determination into a federal suit seeking additional remedies. Those
remedies are available at the outset should the plaintiff choose to pursue them.
Where he elects to proceed otherwise, he must live with his choice. Neither
the statutory language of Title VII, the apparent intent of its drafters, nor
prevailing policy concerns support permitting a plaintiff to split his claims
between the state and federal forums, at least not where he had a choice. These
efforts should, therefore, be thwarted.
The disentanglement of the web ultimately reveals that the viability of
federal Title VII suit depends on its procedural posture. Federal Title VII suits
that follow unreviewed state administrative determinations may proceed
unabashed. State-court judgments reviewing those administrative
determinations, on the other hand, warrant preclusive effect. Thus, federal
suits that seek the same remedies as those sought in state proceedings will
usually fall to a claim-preclusion defense. Cases seeking remedies that were
not available in state proceedings often will also falter: fees-only suits may fail
because of their lack of a sufficient statutory basis, and others will falter
because policy and fairness concerns dictate that claim preclusion apply. The
web may be knotty, but not impossibly so, and the just result lurks at its core.
330. See supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
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